


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# Current History

THE MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

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Coming June, 1959

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# Current History

Vol. 36

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No. 212

*"What disturbs those who find the status quo [in East Europe] unstable is the anomalous position of the satellites," writes Norman Graebner, in the introductory article of this issue. "They are neither independent states nor blocks in the Soviet structure. Time must either free them or destroy their national identities." How are the states of East Central Europe faring? How strong are their ties to the Soviet Union? In the articles that follow, the reader will review the many reasons why the "satellite" states remain behind the iron curtain.*

## The West and the Soviet Satellites

By NORMAN GRAEBNER

*Professor of History, University of Illinois*

RUSSIA'S enduring hegemony over East-Central Europe comprises the central issue of the cold war. Stalin first brought the illusion of Allied wartime unity crashing to the ground when, in defiance of his wartime promises, he refused to relinquish Soviet control of the regions occupied by the Red Army in the closing months of World War II. For 14 years every diplomatic effort to create a stable world built on the principles of self-determination and non-aggression has stumbled and fallen over the question of Eastern Europe's future. Germany's collapse in 1945 held out to an exultant America the promise of a new world order, capable of resolving future international conflict (with Russian cooperation) through the agency of the United Nations. But for Stalin the policies of peace like the policies of war would serve nothing but the Russian interest. Cold war came to Europe because Soviet purpose, as defined by the Kremlin, clashed with the wartime hopes and ideals of the Western world.

Circumstances alter ambitions, and for the Soviet leaders what was unique in the postwar status of Europe was not intent, but opportunity. Czarist purpose of achieving dominion over Eastern Europe had been frustrated for generations by the power of

Britain, France, Germany, Austria and Turkey. But what in the European balance of power had not been undermined by World War I was completely destroyed by the collapse of German power in 1945. Pursuing their goal of unconditional surrender, the Allies expunged all German political authority and created thereby a vast vacuum in Eastern and Central Europe which invited Russian expansion.

Russia's satellite empire was more than the fulfillment of a Pan-Slavic ambition. Its creation was a quest for security. Mid-Europe with its population of over 80 million is potentially one of the most productive regions of the world. It holds the geopolitical balance of power in Europe, and any nation that dominates this strip enjoys a material and strategic advantage over its competitors. Russia's bleak position on an open plain, moreover, invited invasion from Germany twice in one long generation. Soviet postwar policy has had the strategic purpose of guaranteeing Russian security against a resurgent German nation.

Russian power created an empire, but not necessarily a stable one. Nationalism in the Slavic states has always resisted external aggression, whether it be Turkish, Austrian, German or Russian. These are tenacious



countries. Hungarians have remained Hungarians; Poles have remained Poles. If Communist propaganda made relatively few converts in Russia in four decades, it was doubtful if Soviet ideology would have any effect on the people of the satellite nations. It was equally obvious that the people behind the iron curtain would seek their independence at the earliest opportunity. Russian policy is anachronistic. Everywhere since 1945 men and nations have struggled to be free, yet the U.S.S.R. has become involved in policies of national repression. Such actions must take their toll in the constant threat of rebellion. Whatever the Russian intentions for the satellites, those intentions could be achieved only through the brooding omnipresence of the Red Army.

Soviet cold war diplomacy has pursued the essential goal of forcing from the West the recognition of its new hegemony. The Kremlin's demands have been as diplomatically feasible as they have been unpalatable, for the domination of Eastern Europe and the continued partition of Germany have been well within the capabilities of Russian power. This reality has narrowed the alternatives for Western policy. Either the West could bring overwhelming power to bear on the Soviet Union to force compliance to its wartime promises, or it could recognize the new Russian empire and accept its existence as the basis for future negotiations.

American leadership found both courses unacceptable. Obviously the West had no intention of destroying the Russian hegemony over Eastern and Central Europe by force. Yet any diplomatic recognition of Russian aggression would appear to be an abandonment of principle. Strangely, the United States viewed the new Russian empire as a threat not to Western security but to Western ideals. It responded to the iron curtain not with power or diplomacy, but with moral platitudes. This reliance on moral force to deflate the Soviet position served as an escape from dealing with an unpleasant reality and created the illusion of ultimate success.

Powerless to alter the *status quo* behind the iron curtain, the Truman administration sought to stabilize the line of military demarcation. With American economic and military aid, the West after 1947 rebuilt its power to prevent further Russian encroach-

ment on European soil. But this recognition of the iron curtain's existence was provisional, for American leaders assumed that containment would produce tensions in the Soviet structure and force alterations in Soviet purpose. Containment implied an eventual rollback of Soviet power. It was a policy of sanguine expectation, assuming that without war or concession the United States could achieve the gradual release of the satellites from the Soviet grasp.

Under such assumptions of ultimate success, there appeared to be no need for the United States to negotiate with the Soviet Union on the basis of spheres of influence in Europe. Yet any anticipation that the building of Western power would force a change in Soviet purpose had evaporated before the policy was fully consummated. During 1949, the Soviets broke the United States atomic monopoly and continental China fell to Communist leadership and entered the Soviet bloc. Thereafter the task of bringing overwhelming power short of war to bear on the Soviet empire to force concessions became totally impossible.

Since containment soon demonstrated that it could not alter the *status quo*, it seemed to relegate the captive peoples of Europe to permanent oppression. John Foster Dulles, who became Secretary of State in January, 1953, represented the conviction that the United States could do better. He had a deep sense of the importance of moral force in international affairs and supreme confidence in the ultimate success of the right. In his article, "A Policy of Boldness," published in *Life*, May 19, 1952, he created the ultimate expectation for the fulfillment of American purpose. He cast aside the Truman-Acheson concept of limited power and containment as inadequate for the nation, for it was producing no change behind the iron curtain. Mr. Dulles charged that American policy was not even designed to win a victory conclusively. It was designed not to eliminate the peril, but to live with it "presumably forever." The time had come, he wrote, to develop a *dynamic* foreign policy that conformed to *moral* principles. American policy must move beyond "containment"; it must anticipate the "liberation" of those who lived under compulsion behind the iron curtain.

Again in the Republican platform of 1952 Mr. Dulles promised a program that would "mark the end of the negative, futile and immoral policy of 'containment' which abandons countless human beings to a despotism and godless terrorism which in turn enables the rulers to forge the captives into a weapon for our destruction." This new concept of liberation demanded above all that the United States shun any settlement that would recognize Soviet control over alien people. For Germany Mr. Dulles demanded no less than unification based on free elections and Germany's right to remain a member of Nato.

Unfortunately the liberation policy created national goals based on aspirations that had no relation whatever to American power or American interest. For that reason it could lead only to war or embarrassment. If the nation pressed its commitment to liberation into a crisis which demanded American action, it would become involved in war. If in a crisis it denied its commitment, the nation would demonstrate to the world that its pronouncements were meaningless as policy. The clear evidence that the declared purpose would not be backed by force would destroy the diplomatic power of recognition, for thereafter it would make no difference to the antagonist whether the reality was conceded formally or not.

A liberation policy could free no one, but it could create a situation in which the Soviet Union could not relax its hold on the satellites without appearing to suffer a diplomatic defeat. It was evident after 1953 that the satellites were becoming restless under the new freedom which followed the Kremlin's attacks on Stalin's memory. If such changes were the high purpose of Western policy, it was essential that American leadership not pour scorn and ridicule on the Soviets because they appeared to be losing their grip on their own structure.

When the revolts broke out in Poland and Hungary in 1956, the United States government rightly disclaimed all responsibility. Certainly hunger and repression were far more insistent factors in the Poznan rioting than American aspirations of liberation. But it was in Hungary that American policy degenerated abruptly from a major dilemma to tragic failure. Those Hungarian leaders

who cried out for aid, assuming that America's moral purpose of liberation was more than a moral preachment, were informed, with stark realism, that any American effort at assistance would precipitate World War III. But how moral is a policy that forces the United States in a crisis to disclaim all responsibility on the one hand and to deny all aid to those who took the policy seriously on the other? Hungary demonstrated that policy not guided by national interest becomes irresponsible when put to the test.

Unable to halt Russian tanks with moral purpose alone, the United States turned to the U.N. for condemnatory resolutions and got them. Prime Minister Nehru of India warned the West that condemnation would only make matters worse, for under moral pressure the Kremlin could not relent without some admission of immorality.

American abstention in the Hungarian revolt demonstrated that the verbal commitment to liberation was actually a policy of spheres of influence. Through inaction and even the renunciation of force the United States conceded Russian control over the satellites without receiving any concession in return. Even with the support of a major uprising the United States could only admit that it could not and would not change the 1945 line of demarcation. Whatever bargaining power Western recognition of the iron curtain once contained had been squandered by the persistent determination to substitute principles for diplomacy. The West had finally been forced to accept the Stalinist concept of the postwar world.

American policy statements continue to condemn the Russians for their domination of Hungary. Since 1956 the U.N., under United States leadership, has repeatedly called upon the Hungarian regime to comply with the resolutions adopted so overwhelmingly by the General Assembly. On the second anniversary of the Hungarian revolt the State Department announced:

These actions of the Soviet and Hungarian Governments in defiance of the U.N. . . . have occasioned deep concern in the U.S. and elsewhere throughout the world. They cannot and will not be ignored.

In December, 1958, Henry Cabot Lodge, the United States Representative at the U.N., declared that the Hungarian people "must

be relieved of that scourge of terror. . . . If the existing tension is to be relaxed and the danger of still another tragic explosion ended, it will be necessary to end the injustice which causes the tension." Such statements of indignation perpetuate a utopian response to the challenge of Eastern Europe, for whereas they hold out the promise of freedom they scrupulously avoid any reference to means. They create the illusion that American moral purpose still comprises a substitute for containment. Americans forget that in their purpose of freeing the satellites it is not their relations with Eastern Europe that matter, but their relations with the Soviet Union.

If American policy has frozen the *status quo* in Europe, it has not necessarily antagonized Western Europe's present conservative spokesmen. It is not that they have faith in this nation's moral purpose. One European diplomat, after praising American cooperation in saving the Western coalition, remarked at the London Conference of September, 1954: "This is fine, we will accomplish what we came here for; but please, let us not try to do more, let us not embark on any American 'paper' to turn the Russians out of Poland." Europe wants no crusade against the Soviet Union, and some of Mr. Dulles' most vigorous supporters in Europe have always assumed that his motivation was political rather than moral. But whatever the failure of this nation's purpose of liberation, the Eisenhower administration has succeeded in perpetuating the Truman policy of containment. To Europeans this was always a viable and laudable policy, for they never expected more of American power than the maintenance of the *status quo*. As James Reston once observed, Europe's postwar alliance was not with the United States but with the Democratic party.

Europeans have a deep commitment to Nato, for security holds top priority in their scale of values. Diplomacy, therefore, must serve the alliance. For that reason many European leaders oppose any military withdrawal from Central Europe. They regard the plan of Adam Rapacki, the Polish Foreign Minister, for the creation of a "nuclear-free" zone across Central Europe as a trap. They understand that the United

States commitment to the continent of Europe is the keystone of Western security, and they fear that any withdrawal of Allied forces from Germany might result in the withdrawal of American troops from all Europe. Nor would many Western leaders accept any settlement that might eliminate West Germany from the alliance, for the withdrawal of German forces and space from Nato would curtail its power and effectiveness. It would reduce Nato operations to little but nuclear retaliation. And it would buttress the Soviet diplomatic arm and give the Kremlin additional leverage to bend the nations of Europe to its will.

For many Europeans the division of the continent into two huge military camps is their guarantee against uncertainty. They have no real interest in the creation of a united Germany with a will of its own. They doubt that Germany could be neutralized successfully because of its potential industrial and military might. Countless numbers of Western Europeans who pay lip service to the concept of German unification do not care to face a powerful, free and unstable Germany again. They would regard its creation as the final measure of their defeat in World War II. Rather than face such a hazard they accept policies designed to perpetuate a divided Central Europe, guaranteed in its stability by American and Soviet forces.

They have no greater desire to replace oppression with instability in Eastern Europe. Before their submergence into the Nazi empire, these nations were neither orderly nor democratic. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, they were weak, authoritarian, without viable economies, and torn by minority problems. They could not manage their internal affairs or play any reassuring role in world affairs. If Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe is undesirable, it has the advantage of guaranteeing peace. As independent nations lying between a rejuvenated Germany and a security-conscious U.S.S.R. they might again invite aggression and war as they did in 1939. For many liberation even by diplomacy is not worth the risk to Europe's stability.

Europeans recall that the West has lived with a swollen Soviet empire for the past dozen years without becoming bankrupt or





suffering any loss of freedom and believes that the West can continue to do so through an indefinite future. Since they regard the present situation as tolerable, they are under no compulsion to seek any settlements which would require the concession of Western security positions to the Soviet Union. They believe that a hard military line is Europe's best guarantee of peace, for the consequences of challenging that line by force are clear. The Russians understand that any attack across the frontier between East and West would bring retaliation; the West knows that any effort to support revolution behind the iron curtain would bring the Red Army crashing down on Western Europe. Central and Eastern Europe comprise the one region of the world where interests are manifest. Here no nation can challenge the *status quo* without the deliberate intention of starting a war.

Security-conscious Europeans regard the present military stalemate as the best of all possible worlds in the face of Soviet intransigence. They would regard any policy as irrational that endangered Western security in its pursuit of a German settlement or an ephemeral new deal for the satellites.

Western policy, despite its wide acceptance, has been subjected to critical examination by both European and American observers. Those who regard present policy as too inflexible reject the assumptions upon which it is built—that security is the key issue and that any negotiations will endanger it. They believe the matter of security is overemphasized and Western action is unnecessarily dangerous. They refuse to regard war with the Soviet Union as inevitable. They doubt that the Kremlin seeks to conquer more of Europe by force, and they accept without question the repeated assurances of Western spokesmen that Nato will never war on the U.S.S.R. They see no acceptable purpose, therefore, in maintaining the rigid cold war posture across the center of Europe, with weapons of destruction massed within easy range of one another where they pose a constant threat to peace.

Second, such critics are willing to accept the fact that Western power, no matter how greatly it is concentrated in Central Europe, will never achieve any rollback of the military line of demarcation. Western diplo-

macy might well begin, therefore, by accepting this reality. To them presently-divided Europe represents a persistent failure of Western purpose, for it leaves the Soviet Union in possession of every area that caused the initial collapse of the wartime alliance. If Western intransigence can gain nothing except continued stalemate and the recognition of Soviet success, then the West might cease its overdemanding and negotiate an end to the cold war.

What disturbs those who find the *status quo* unstable is the anomalous position of the satellites. They are neither independent states nor blocks in the Soviet structure. Time must either free them or destroy their national identities. There must be either further repression or further outbreaks. The West can no longer anticipate further revolts nor act as if it wants them to occur, for Hungary demonstrated that American leadership has no intention of endangering Chicago to liberate Budapest. Repression may be so long and continuous that apathy and despair will destroy all local resistance.

Western power, despite its unprecedented magnitude, offers no greater assurance of freedom. It can never become overwhelming enough to force concessions from the Kremlin leaders short of war. Conventional armies could achieve liberation only with the defeat of the Red Army. Even the total destruction of Soviet power with deterrent weapons would produce such heavy casualties and devastation in the liberated regions that no political gains could offset the damage that only generations of effort could restore. If the people of Eastern and Central Europe prefer atomic annihilation to continued life in the Soviet sphere, they have not said so. No Western policy has offered any hope or expectation of eventual freedom to Eastern Europe. Policy which demands all merely confirms the divisions of Europe.

Liberation requires no less than the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Only when the Red Army has been ordered back to Russia's borders can there be any evolution toward new institutions and social systems. But the question of Soviet troops cannot be divorced from that of Russian security, and security for Russia, as for the West, hinges on the future of Germany. As long as the threat of a burgeoning West Germany is bolstered by



Nato forces, the Kremlin will persist in its intention of maintaining the military balance by occupying East Germany and the satellites. Central Europe's future is the key to the satellite problem. Western proposals on Germany have demanded that the Soviets concede their military and political bastion built at the terrible price of Germany's defeat in World War II without receiving any compensation or security guarantees. To the Russians any settlement that did not achieve the withdrawal of Western forces from Germany would constitute unconditional surrender.

George F. Kennan and other critics of Western policy have accused European leaders of supporting the American accent on military power and diplomatic rigidity because they are determined to escape the responsibility of facing the problem of German power and ambition. They hesitate to face the questions of European security alone. American policy absolves them of the need of leadership while it offers no response to the challenge of the iron curtain and consigns half of Europe to the U.S.S.R.

West Berlin—a strategic outpost in the Soviet zone—presents a serious problem. Here the Western position is insecure and made more so by the determined Soviet purpose of elevating the East German regime as the spokesman on matters of access. For the Kremlin there is little choice, for it must free itself of direct responsibility should this powder keg explode. Now the Soviet leadership has given the West until May to swallow its pride and open negotiations with the East German government on West Berlin's future. This issue confronts the West with the most dangerous and divisive challenge since the beginning of the cold war. To escape its dilemma, the West has again proposed negotiations on the entire German question.

This is logical, for any cold war settlement must begin with Germany, and no German settlement is possible that does not leave the balance of security exactly as it was before negotiations began. Those who condemn the concept of disengagement declare that it would weaken Western security and would be unacceptable to the Kremlin. Both criticisms cannot be true. Any proposal that obviously undermined the Western position

would be received by the Soviets with both hands. German neutralization would not necessarily break up Nato or force a withdrawal of American troops from the continent. For Nato existed long before West Germany became a member, and United States forces could remain on French, Belgian and British soil. Whatever security interests are satisfied by Nato would continue to hold Western Europe to its membership.

Thus any fair offer of disengagement would meet its real obstacle in a Soviet rejection. This would be no evidence of failure. Russia's rejection of a reasonable proposal for a settlement in Central Europe would place the onus of diplomatic stalemate on that nation for the first time in the cold war. Sound and concrete proposals would undermine the Soviet peace crusade throughout the free world. Any Soviet refusal of a Western offer to retreat as part of a general settlement would spell out the true nature of Soviet purpose. Thereafter there would be little excuse for continued complacency or the conviction that continued stalemate was in itself successful policy. For what really matters in Western security is not Russian intent but Western unity. Western morale cannot be sustained unless people facing the perennial threat of atomic annihilation can live in the conviction that Western leadership has not neglected any avenue to peace. The negative line of recent years has not always assured the free world of the efficacy of Western policy. To accept the *status quo* as the basis of negotiation may be painful for those who once had high hopes of terminating the cold war on terms of Western principles, but ignoring what is painful has seldom resolved it.

Norman A. Graebner, formerly Associate Professor of History at Iowa State College, is a frequent contributor to *Current History*, and a contributing editor. Early in 1958, Professor Graebner delivered the Commonwealth Fund Lectures in London on the subject, "The Revolution in American Politics, 1837-1877." He is the author of *Empire on the Pacific* and *The New Isolationism*, and is also a contributor to many scholarly journals.

*Although East Germany is anxious to remove the "Western foothold in Berlin," this specialist observes that "Union with Western Germany . . . is fraught with dangers for the Communist regime. . . ."*

## Berlin and Two Germanies

By A. F. K. ORGANSKI

*Associate Professor of Political Science, Brooklyn College*

**E**AST-WEST controversy over the future of the city of Berlin has thrown into sharp relief one of the most fundamental differences that separate the two camps, the difference in hopes and fears concerning the role of Germany in Europe's future. The Berlin crisis has forced both sides to re-evaluate the importance of Germany in their security and economic plans in an attempt to compromise this long-standing difference, or—if compromise proves impossible—to obtain the maximum advantage from the existing situation.

The opening shot of the current controversy was fired by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. In a speech on Soviet foreign affairs in November, 1958, in honor of First Secretary of the Polish United Workers (Communist) party Wladyslaw Gomulka and a Polish delegation visiting Moscow, Premier Khrushchev lashed out at the Western occupation of Berlin and asserted that the Potsdam agreement providing for quadripartite control of Berlin was legally out of date.<sup>1</sup> Far more important, Khrushchev announced Russian intentions of transferring Soviet functions as an occupying power in Berlin to the East Germans. He suggested that the Western powers come to an agreement directly with the German Democratic Republic about their interests in Berlin.

The Russian premier elaborated his initial

statement in a press conference on November 27. He proposed that Berlin be made a free city, that it be demilitarized, and promised that the West would have unhampered entry into the city. Russia was willing to wait six months so that measures to put this plan into effect could be carried out, but at the end of this period the Soviet Union would transfer its occupation powers in Berlin to the East Germans. Henceforth the Allies would have to deal with the East German government regarding communications with Berlin. Khrushchev warned the Allies not to try to force their way through East Germany to Berlin, for such an act would be considered an attack upon the Soviet Union.

Finally, in January, 1959, the Soviet Union addressed a diplomatic note to 27 nations (including Communist China) in which it presented a full blown draft of a German peace treaty. The draft treaty included in the Russian note bore a striking resemblance to the one ex-Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov had proposed in 1954 at the foreign ministers' conference in Berlin. The draft, apparently dusted off for the new occasion, incorporated the following proposals: that Berlin should become a free and demilitarized city, that East and West Germany, each retaining its social and economic and political organization, should be united in a confederacy, and that this new Germany should be forbidden to join any alliance whose members did not include all of the 28 signatory states.

None of the Russian proposals stood any chance of being accepted by the West, and it is unlikely that the Russians themselves

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<sup>1</sup> Khrushchev's mistaken identification of the Potsdam treaty as the legal basis for the presence of Allied soldiers in Berlin caused some amusement in the West. The Russian premier unobtrusively corrected his mistake at the press conference of November 27, 1958.

expected acceptance of their proposals. Rather, the Russians probably considered their suggestions an opening move and hoped that they would stimulate the West into offering counterproposals.

### The Western Response

The Russian attack on the Allied occupation of Berlin initiated a period of anxiety and speculation in the West as to Soviet goals and intentions. The threat to our presence in Berlin and to our policy of nonrecognition of the German Democratic Republic was clear. Thoughts turned to an airlift as a means of supplying the Berlin garrison without East German approval, but even an airlift would not avoid contaminating contact with the East German government if air traffic control were turned over to the East Germans along with other communication lines.

Judging from their disagreement and vacillation, the Western powers were caught off guard by the diplomatic and political assault of the Soviet Union. Only under pressure did the Allies begin consultations to hammer out a common policy, not an easy task after the crisis was already in progress. All of the Western powers, however, were agreed upon one very important point: they were not going to be pushed out of Berlin by Russian threats. It was this fundamental agreement that underlay the three separate but similar notes to Moscow flatly rejecting Khrushchev's first proposal to make Berlin<sup>2</sup> a free, demilitarized city. However, the Allied answers included a suggestion that the Western powers would be willing to discuss the issue of Berlin within the framework of a discussion of German reunification and European security. It was apparently in answer to this suggestion that the Russians ten days later presented their proposal for a German peace treaty in the note to 27 nations.

This last Russian proposal found the Western powers split by three major differences: whether to deal with the East German government when (and if) the Russians left them in control of communications with West Berlin; whether free elections were to

be considered a prerequisite to German reunification; and whether to negotiate with the Russians before the May 27 deadline set by Khrushchev.

The West German government held the most intransigent view, refusing to deal with the East German regime, insisting on free elections as a first step toward reunification, and fearing that negotiations with the Russians before May 27 would appear to be giving in to Soviet pressure. Paris supported Bonn, partly in exchange for the support Bonn had given Paris in her quarrel with Britain over the European Common Market and partly because of France's traditional fear of a strong Germany. The French were well satisfied with a permanently split Germany whose Western half was being integrated into Western Europe.

Britain initially adopted a more conciliatory approach, disliking the idea of dealing with the East Germans, but set against the use of force. Faced with Labor party demands for a more positive policy toward Russia, Britain's Conservative government was especially interested in early negotiations and sent Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to Moscow even in advance of formal negotiations.

American policy vacillated, first appearing to support the stiff attitude of the West Germans and the French, then veering more toward the British view, again partly in response to political pressures at home. United States Secretary of State John F. Dulles' first job was to compromise Allied differences and if necessary compel agreement upon a common Allied policy on Berlin and on the German question in general. In his flying trip to Europe, Dulles secured Allied agreement to inviting the Russians to a Big Four foreign ministers' meeting. Russia, however, refused, demanding a summit meeting instead.

As the Berlin crisis draws to a climax, it is necessary to see the positions of the two major contestants, the United States and Russia, not merely as a quarrel over the status of Berlin but in relation to the broader questions of policy regarding Germany and European security. The Germans themselves, as the body being fought over, have interests in the case somewhat different from those of the other major parties.

<sup>2</sup> Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan stated in a television interview while visiting the United States that the offer to make a free city of Berlin applied only to West Berlin since East Berlin was the capital of East Germany and could not be included in the bargain.



### American Interests in Berlin

Allied control of West Berlin is not an unmixed blessing so far as the United States is concerned. Militarily, West Berlin cannot be defended. Surrounded by East Germany and by Russian troops, it would be overrun immediately if hostilities were to begin. In addition, West Berlin represents a financial drain for the United States, which contributes more than \$30 million a year to West Berlin finances over and above the cost of maintaining American military forces in the city.<sup>3</sup>

Obviously, Berlin has a value to the West that far outweighs these liabilities. Situated 110 miles behind the iron curtain and allowing easy contact with satellite citizens, Berlin has all the makings of an ideal spot from which to gather intelligence about events in East Germany. Statistics on such activities naturally are not available. However, it is interesting to note that the Russians estimate that the United States and the other Western powers have more than 60 espionage organizations in West Berlin.<sup>4</sup> Berlin also has great value in the propaganda war with Russia, for it is the only place in the world where a satellite people and Russian soldiers can see for themselves how the free world lives and compare life in a Western democracy with their own undernourished and regimented lives.

Neither of these considerations, however, explains the United States' deep concern over West Berlin and the risks we are willing to undertake on its behalf. Much of the importance of our presence in West Berlin lies in the fact that Berlin has become a symbol of American commitment in Europe and a measure of our good faith to those who have chosen our side against the Communist bloc. Any move on our part to abandon 2.2 million West Berliners to Communist absorption would be regarded as an act of infamy.

American presence in Berlin is also a symbol of our hope that the present division of Germany is only temporary and of our faith that if the German people are ever allowed to choose their own fate through free

elections, the Communist German Democratic Republic will prove to be temporary as well. Should we abandon West Berlin it would signal our abandonment of any hope of seeing East Germany become part of a united Germany tied to the West.

Thus far, the United States and the other Western Allies have refused to sanctify the existing division of Germany by recognizing the East German regime. Instead, we have concentrated on integrating West Germany into the Western bloc both militarily and economically and have held to the hope that East Germany, too, would join the Western bloc if ever she were freed to make a choice. Our demands for free elections as a means of reunifying Germany show our optimism regarding East Germany, for there is no doubt in anyone's mind that communism would be defeated in such elections. The European Common Market Treaty and its clauses regarding trade between West and East Germany as "German internal trade" evidence our hope to achieve in the field of economics what free elections would achieve in the political arena.

Such policies rest on the assumption that West Germany is essential to the wealth and power of the Western bloc whether united with East Germany or not. German economic strength is needed for European prosperity, and German military might is necessary if Nato is to do anything more than furnish a legal right for the United States and England to keep troops and supplies in advanced positions in Western Europe.

Recently it has been contended by such experts as George Kennan that communism has no attraction for Western Europe and that even if Germany were neutralized there would be no danger of her going Communist. This is probably true, but the reason the United States hesitates to withdraw its troops and neutralize Germany is not because we fear Germany will go Communist, but because we cannot afford a sharp and sudden decrease in our power advantage over the Communist bloc. The fact is that we need the contribution Germany makes to the total power advantage of the West, especially now that Russia is increasing both her power and her wealth so rapidly.

Our commitment to stay in Berlin has been strengthened by our very success in re-

<sup>3</sup> This figure includes flow back from revolving funds set up under the Marshall Plan. Norman I. Gelman, *Berlin Crisis and German Reunification* (Editorial Research Reports, vol. 11, no. 24), p. 960.

<sup>4</sup> Russian State Security Chief Aleksandr Shelepin so reported to the recent Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. *The New York Times*, Feb. 5, 1959, p. 8, col. 3.

sisting previous Russian efforts to dislodge us. We have succeeded in remaining in Berlin throughout these recent years in which the power of the West has clearly been greater than that of the Communist bloc. A retreat now would be taken by many as evidence that we are frightened by Russia's newly acquired nuclear missile power, that the distribution of power in Europe and in the world has already shifted in favor of the Soviet Union, as the Russians claim it has. Thus the way in which the Berlin case is settled will represent an index of the relative power of the United States and Russia.

### **Russian Interests in Berlin**

Soviet interests in the Berlin case are equally complex. The continued presence of American, English and French troops in Berlin is in itself undesirable to the Russians. As Khrushchev told United States Senator Hubert Humphrey: "It is a bone in my throat." Russia, too, sees these troops as a symbol of Western strength and of Russia's defeat in the Berlin blockade of a decade ago, as a living proof of our commitment to stay in Europe and to resist Soviet expansion. Russia, too, is aware of the damage to Communist morale caused by this show window of the West.

Russian interests do not end here, however. It seems clear that the Soviet Union is utilizing its control over communications with Berlin in an effort to affect the entire orientation of Western policy toward Germany. A prime Russian objective is to prevent the West from arming West Germany with rockets that can carry nuclear warheads. Russian reaction to having been attacked twice within a lifetime by Germany is an almost pathological fear of the Germans. The consistency of Russian policy toward Germany in the post-war period bears witness to the strength of this fear. Her wish for a neutralized Germany is only its latest expression.

The Soviet Union is also disturbed by Western success in integrating West Germany into the European economy, particularly by the creation of the common market with its attempt to keep an economic tie between West and East Germany. Such a Western attempt must interfere with the stabilization of the German Democratic Re-

public and its integration into Eastern Europe.

The Berlin crisis gives Russia a chance to demand either a neutralized, united Germany or a clear and final break between East and West Germany. In the one case she would win freedom from her fear of West Germany and decrease the military potential of the West. In the other case she would at least assure the final absorption of East Germany into the Communist system. Either eventuality would be preferable to the present situation in which West Germany is becoming a full partner in the Western alliance and is beckoning to captive East Germany as well.

Even if negotiations on the larger German questions come to nothing, the Soviet Union hopes to force the West to give official recognition to the East German regime, for the German Democratic Republic needs bolstering and nothing would raise its prestige more than Western recognition of its existence. The Eastern bloc is now going through a process of harsh economic integration, an event of great importance that has received little attention in the West. Because of this, it is important to the Russians that Western beckoning to the East Germans stop and the East Germans resign themselves to a Communist future.

Finally, the Berlin crisis is useful to the Soviet Union as a means of provoking discord among the Western Allies and of giving opposition parties in these nations a new occasion for demanding a more conciliatory policy toward the Soviet Union. Indeed, the Berlin crisis has already served this purpose well.

### **German Interests in Berlin**

For Western Germany, continued control of West Berlin is of even greater importance than to the rest of the Western bloc, for Berlin, the former capital, is a symbol of united Germany's past greatness and of her future hopes. No West German government could decide to abandon West Berlin and with it all hope of reuniting Germany and survive the political consequences.

Not only is West Berlin the object of a powerful sentimental attachment, but it is also West Germany's most convincing argument in the running battle with the Com-

munists for the minds of the East German population. West Berlin with its beautiful new buildings, its luxurious shops and its bustling prosperity is not simply a show window for the Western world in general; it is a display of the specific virtues of the Federal Republic of Germany, a display so attractive that it lures a steady stream of runaway labor and talent from East Germany. The importance of West Berlin to the West German government can be gauged by the fact that the Bonn government has been contributing more than \$200 million a year to the West Berlin city government.

West Germany can be expected to be even more adamant than the other Allies in refusing to allow the creation of a so-called "free" city of Berlin cut off from its ties with Western Germany. However, the parallel Russian proposal for a reunified, neutralized Germany has a powerful appeal to many West Germans. Much as the West Germans value their ties to the West, it is probable that a good proportion would be willing to sever at least their military ties with the West in exchange for formal reunification of the country. Such feelings are not confined to the political opposition of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. They can be found within the Chancellor's own party. Although the Adenauer government has thus far firmly resisted Soviet offers and threats, it cannot fail to be interested in proposals made by the Russians.

#### Communist Germany's Position

For the Communist East German government, the existing situation in Berlin is intolerable. Western presence and Western example in the middle of East Germany not only undermine the loyalties of the East German populace but also undermine the East German government's physical control of its subjects. Throughout East Germany, Berlin is famous as an escape hatch; particularly during the past year, the East German regime has been plagued with large-scale desertion of the young people on whom it must depend for its future. The problem has been especially acute because many of the escapees are young men and women who have received technical educations. The escapees report that more of their friends are waiting to com-

plete their studies at government expense before leaving. Such desertion to the West by the potential élite of East Germany is a vote of no confidence more severe in its consequences than any indictment at the polls would be.

Elimination of the Western foothold in Berlin would be a most welcome relief to the East German government. So, too, would be the official Western recognition which the Russians are seeking to win for their German satellite. Union with Western Germany, however, is fraught with dangers for the Communist regime, which would surely find itself out of office if complete political unification were effected. The only "unification" supported by the East German government must be a loose federation or some other arrangement by which Russian control of East Germany can be continued, for only with Russian force behind them can the East German Communists remain in power.

#### The Predicament

It need hardly be mentioned that the East German people do not have the same interests in West Berlin as their government. There can be no doubt that the people strongly favor the preservation of the present status of West Berlin both as a symbol of future German unity and as the only possible door to freedom still slightly ajar.

It is difficult to imagine how even the most patient negotiation could produce a solution mutually satisfactory to all of the parties involved in the Berlin dispute, for the quarrel involves not simply the future of the city but the future of Germany and of European security as well. The existing situation is far more favorable to the West than it is to the Communist world, and for this reason, the Russians have sought to upset it. The provoking of a crisis over Berlin may be viewed primarily as an attempt to integrate East Germany firmly into the Communist bloc and if possible to disrupt the full participation of West Germany in the Western Alliance. A successful solution of the Berlin crisis would require compromise on both sides, but thus far the Soviet Union has offered nothing that would compensate the West for the loss of such a powerful ally.



Analyzing Poland's position within the Soviet bloc, this author makes the assertion that "Poland's situation is analagous to that of Yugoslavia except that Tito was forced to make an open break with the Soviet Union . . . Gomulka has continued to maintain his precarious perch." ". . . Gomulka has attempted the well-nigh impossible job of resisting Soviet domination. . . ."

# Poland: Geography for Disaster

By HUEY LOUIS KOSTANICK

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**T**HE basic objective of Poland's post-war foreign policy can be summed up best in one word—survival. In the past, Poland has been dismembered four times. In 1772, Poland's lands were divided between Austria, Prussia and Russia; in 1792, between Russia and Prussia; in 1795, again between Austria, Prussia and Russia; and in 1939, between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Yet each time Poland rose like the fabled phoenix from the ashes of its ruins to recreate a new state—a state faced with the same historical problem of resisting conquest from the Germans to the west and the Russians to the east.<sup>1</sup>

Since the tenth century, the Poles have occupied the rolling plains of northern Europe; indeed, their very name means "dwellers of the plain." The valley of the Vistula River has been their traditional heartland, although settlement has extended westward to the Oder River and eastward to the Pripet Marshes.

To the south of the Polish plain are the high Sudeten and Beskid mountain chains that separate Poland from Czechoslovakia.

To the north is the Baltic Sea. Thus, mountain and sea rim in the plain on north and south. But, unfortunately for the Poles, there are no significant natural barriers to movement east and west. Hence Polish lands have been subject to invasion from east or west over the course of centuries, particularly from the neighboring Germans, Russians and Lithuanians.

Although there have been numerous and bloody campaigns against the Poles, the contest over Polish lands cannot be called primarily military. Nor can the struggle be described as essentially diplomatic, waged primarily for political administration. Instead, the vital issue has been actual occupation and settlement of the lands by specific peoples—settlement too often based upon destruction and expulsion of the previous inhabitants.

The gory history of this massive "*kulturkampf*" or "battle of cultures" over Polish lands has created mutual hatred, resentment and mistrust among the many peoples involved. The reaction of the Poles has been an intense Polish nationalism, one of the strongest in all Europe.

Such nationalism was made even more intense in World War II by the atrocities perpetrated by the Germans, whose policy of genocide aimed at mass destruction of the Poles. So bestial was German occupation that it far overshadowed the actions of the Russians, even though the Russians also carried out a series of "pogroms" against the

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<sup>1</sup>Two recent studies of interest are Clifford R. Barnett, *Poland*, New York, Grove Press, 1958, 471 pp. and Oscar Halecki, *Poland*, (Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee), New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1957, 601 pp.

Poles. Hence, when the Russians adopted the role of protectors of the Polish state and of Polish rights in Germany, the Poles found themselves in a chaotic situation: ruled by a Communist government, occupied by Soviet troops, and linked ever more closely to the Soviet Union by strong economic, political and military ties.

This, then, is the dichotomy and dilemma of Polish post-war foreign policy. On the one hand, the Poles hate both the Germans and Russians as mortal enemies; on the other hand, territorial security and domination by a Communist government bind Poland to the Soviet Union and enforce political alliance with the East German Communist state.

#### Poland Moved Westward

Poland today stems from the Poland formed in 1919 as part of the peace settlement of World War I. Formation of the state was anything but peaceful. The Germans resented Polish annexation of a major part of industrial Silesia and also of the "Polish Corridor" that gave the new state direct if limited access to the Baltic Sea. Czechoslovakia became incensed over the division of Teschen. Lithuania contested Polish seizure of the Vilna (*Wilno*) area. In addition, the Russians were bitter over Polish conquest of parts of White Russia and the Ukraine in 1921.

World War II created an entirely different Poland. In 1945, Poland was forced to cede by treaty some 70,000 square miles of its eastern territories to the Soviet Union. In compensation, the Allies gave Poland military occupation and political administration of some 40,000 square miles of German territory east of a new Oder-Neisse boundary. This included the southern part of East Prussia (the northern part went to the Soviet Union), and a long strip of east Germany from Stettin in the north to German Silesia in the south. In addition, the formerly internationalized city of Danzig was placed under Polish administration.

The difference in the legal aspects of these territorial exchanges is of the utmost significance for the future of Poland. Whereas the territorial award to the Soviet Union was made by treaty and is legally binding, Polish administration of the German territories is only temporary pending a peace treaty with

Germany. It is this *de facto* rather than *de jure* status which plagues Poland, because if the occupied territories should revert to Germany, Poland would be reduced to a rump state of insignificant proportions and insignificant power.

#### Geopolitical Appraisal of the New State

The new Poland was shifted bodily some 150 miles to the west. Although smaller in size (120,000 square miles in contrast to the previous 150,000 square miles) the new state is more compact and the present boundary much shorter than the old. An important gain is much greater access to the Baltic Sea because the new coast line is five times as long as before. Poland is now a Baltic sea power with the addition of the German ports of Stettin (*Szczecin*) and Danzig (*Gdansk*) to the Polish-built port of Gdynia. All three have major port and shipbuilding installations and good rail and road connections with the interior of Poland.

Another gain is that the agricultural lands annexed from Germany are more productive than those lost to the Russians. An accessory advantage of the new lands, which were vacated by the Germans, was the possibility of using them for resettling Poles repatriated from the lands lost to the Russians and for absorbing Poles from the over-populated rural areas. But most important of all was the annexation of German Silesia with its tremendous industrial capacity and its wealthy deposits of coal, iron ore and other valuable minerals.

In addition to these economic changes, the war created a significantly different ethnic structure. In 1939, more than one-third of the population of Poland was formed of ethnic minorities, such as Germans, Jews, White Russians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians. But as a result of wartime deaths and mass migration and transfer of peoples, Poland has become surprisingly homogeneous. It is now estimated that so great has been the reduction of minorities that Poles themselves now form some 95 per cent of the total population.

The end result of all this has been to change Poland from a predominantly rural-agricultural country to a predominantly urban-industrial one. So great in fact was the increase of productive capacity that in

1958 Poland became the leading industrial producer in Eastern Europe, surpassing the industrial production of Czechoslovakia, the previous leader. The relation of such phenomenal progress to foreign policy is direct—increased urbanization and industrialization are due primarily to the annexation of the already industrialized and urbanized German lands rather than to increased production in Polish lands. Hence loss of the annexed territories would mean a crippling loss in industrial power.

#### Relations with the Big Bear

Poland is the largest of the East European satellites. Since the end of the war its closest link has been with the Soviet Union. There has been little chance to act otherwise. Occupied at the end of the war by Soviet armies, still fearful and instilled with hatred of the Germans and still distrustful of obtaining substantial help from the Western nations, the Poles accepted Communist domination of the new Polish government in 1945.

Since 1945, there have been three major periods of political action, each affecting relations with the Soviet Union. From 1945 to 1948 there was the initial period consolidating Communist control of all phases of Polish life by associating the new communism with traditional Polish nationalism. During this period the movement toward collectivization of land was held in check and there was a nominal form of cooperation between the state and the powerful Catholic church. Gomulka was one of the Polish Communist leaders during this period.

But in late 1948, the pattern was abruptly changed. Violent purges put Gomulka and others in disgrace and a period of "sovietization" of Poland was instituted during which Soviet patterns and ideas were openly imposed on Poland. Forced collectivization began to take place in conjunction with campaigns to increase agricultural production. A new industrial Six-Year Plan was initiated in 1950.

In 1949, repressive measures were applied against the Catholic Church with open attempts to establish complete control of all ecclesiastical affairs. In 1953, Cardinal Wyszynski was tried and suspended from office. A great number of organizations of

all sorts were organized from youth groups to literary societies. The entire gamut of literary effort became subject to party conformity. The death of Stalin in 1953 provided a temporary lull in Soviet pressure; yet before significant changes could occur, the lid was put on again.

But by 1955 internal ferment could no longer be suppressed. A "thaw" set in as Polish writers began to express open criticisms. Such criticism intensified after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in February, 1956. On June 28, 1956, riots broke out in Poznan and were quelled only by using the Polish army.

The Poznan uprising put the existing regime under Premier Cyrankiewicz on the defensive. At the Seventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party (P.Z.P.R.), Party Secretary Ochab openly admitted public dissatisfaction with economic conditions and promised reforms. In the same session, the Communists expelled in 1948 were "rehabilitated to full party membership."

By October the lid could no longer be held on the boiling pot of Polish ferment. Violent riots broke out. The key period was October 19 and 20, 1956, when the Eighth Plenary Session met and elected Gomulka to the Central Committee. In short order a delegation of Soviet officials arrived, headed by Khrushchev. During this critical time the Polish Communists held firm against Russian demands that repressive control should be reestablished. Gomulka became the new party leader and thus began the return to the "Polish Road to Socialism."

The Polish revolution differed from the Hungarian revolution in two critical respects. The first was that although the revolt was openly "anti-Russian," there was little indication that it would turn into an "anti-Communist" revolution like the Hungarian. The second was that there was available a Communist leader, Gomulka, who was acceptable to the Polish people, the Soviet leaders and to the Polish Communists who were in power at the time. It was a vital point that Party Secretary Ochab was willing to accept Gomulka rather than ask for Soviet troops to suppress the revolt as happened in Hungary.

An immediate note of success was struck by the expulsion of Marshall Rokossovsky, a



Soviet citizen although Polish-born, and his replacement by a Pole, Spychalski, as head of the Polish armed forces. Another favorable omen was a Polish-Soviet agreement in December, 1956, recognizing the full sovereignty of the Polish state and providing for only the temporary stationing of Soviet troops in Poland.

The Polish swing toward independence was also shown by the vote in the United Nations on November 21, 1956, that United Nations observers be permitted to enter Hungary. Although the rest of the Soviet bloc voted against the motion, the Polish delegation abstained, thus marking its first deviation from Soviet action. Another bold act was the strengthening of Polish relations with "Titoist" Yugoslavia.

But however strong the Polish urge to independence, Gomulka soon realized that deviationist action against the Soviet Union could be undertaken only within a narrow range. This came out clearly in the elections of January 20, 1957, when the Gomulka faction won a landslide victory after Gomulka made it evident to the people that an anti-Communist vote would mean "the deletion of Poland from the map of Europe." He did not have to explain who would do the deleting.

#### Climactic Point

The period from October, 1956, through January, 1957, was the climactic period for Polish independence and internal freedom. Since that time Gomulka has attempted the well-nigh impossible job of resisting Soviet domination, staying in the good graces of the Soviet Union and of the other satellites, and at the same time undertaking direct negotiations for trade and contacts with the West, especially the United States.

The result of these antipathetic objectives has been to create internal confusion and strife and erratic changes in the direction of Polish foreign policy although the general trend has been continuously greater subservience to the Soviet Union by the Polish government. Poland's situation is analogous to that of Yugoslavia except that Tito was forced to make an open break with the Soviet Union in 1948; Gomulka has continued to maintain his precarious perch.

Internally, there has been a strong move-

ment to censure both the liberal faction of the Communist party and the old-line Stalinists, the so-called "Natolin" faction. In October, 1957, the government took the highly unpopular action of banning the liberal student Communist weekly, *Po Prostu*.

By May, 1958, Poland's controversies with other satellites over what was proper Communist policy diminished under the threat of West German rearmament and under the force of Khrushchev's consolidation of power in the Soviet Union. In June, Gomulka moved even closer to orthodoxy with a condemnation of Hungary's Nagy and with an open attack on Tito, although in both cases his statements carried traces of Polish independence.

In July, 1958, came another major instance of the reassertion of suppression when security police raided the ancient monastery of Jasna Gora, the most sacred Polish Catholic shrine. This initiated a renewed attack on the Catholic Church which had gained a favorable position with the Gomulka government by tacitly supporting his regime.

Gomulka's drastic retreat from the October Revolution was made evident in the Twelfth Plenum of the Party held in October, 1958, when he defined the fundamental principle of Polish-Soviet policy as the strengthening of the unity of the Socialist states.

Thus 1959 again finds Poland a land of extreme inner tensions, where government policies have changed from the liberal promises of the October Revolution of 1956 to the grim realities of Soviet orthodoxy. Once again Polish writers are in open rebellion as evidenced by the Ninth Congress of the Writers' Union held in Wroclaw on December 15-16, 1958. And once again economic difficulties, suppression of the church and a drive for conformity are creating intense inner ferment. Yet such ferment has also been drastically checked by a realization of what happened to Hungary and by a focus on Berlin and the question of German reunification.

#### Poland and German Reunification

On October 2, 1957, Adam Rapacki, the Foreign Minister of Poland, presented a proposal to the United Nations that a "nuclear free zone" be created in central Europe, composed of the German Republics and of

Poland and Czechoslovakia. From the Polish point of view the Rapacki plan had great merit. Internally it would weaken the hold of Soviet troops through a ban on nuclear weapons and through periodic inspection by Western observers. Similarly, it would weaken the German threat by means of a weapons ban and by foreign inspection. Although the Soviet Union approved this proposal, it was made plain that this was a Polish and not a Soviet plan.

On November 27, 1958, the Soviet Union issued a proposal<sup>2</sup> concerning the evacuation of Berlin by the four occupying powers and the possible creation of West Berlin as a "free city." It was stated that if such an agreement was not reached within six months, the control of East Berlin and Western access to West Berlin would be turned over to East German authorities. The proposal also suggested that Germany should be unified by a confederation of East and West Germany.

On January 10, 1959, the Soviet Union again confronted the West with a proposal to 28 nations to undertake immediate discussions of a German peace treaty. These Soviet proposals have created a serious dilemma for Poland. Not only do they raise the specter of a unified Germany but they revive the whole question of the Potsdam Agreement which gave Poland administrative control of the former German territories now incorporated into Poland. Although East Germany has recognized Polish annexation, West Germany has not. Hence, the question of renewed German demands. In addition to reviving the German crisis, the Soviet proposals would make the Rapacki plan unnecessary, thus minimizing chances for any significant change in the Polish situation.

Faced with the full realization of the dangers to Poland opened by the Soviet proposals, Gomulka nonetheless came out with full support of the Russian stand, including the Soviet view of the Potsdam Agreement. This shows the extent to which Poland is again dominated by Soviet policies and how little headway has been made in Poland by the West since the October Revolution.

#### Poland and the West

In 1956, it appeared that a major breakthrough had been made in the Iron Curtain and that Poland might become another

Yugoslavia. Polish nationalism seemed to constitute a realistic threat to Soviet domination. In a mutual effort to create at least a chink in the Iron Curtain, Poland opened negotiations with Great Britain and the United States. Although initial efforts to secure a loan of \$50 million from the United States were unsuccessful, on February 15, 1958, an agreement was signed for a loan of \$98 million of which \$73 million was for United States agricultural surpluses and \$25 million was provided in credit for the purchase of United States raw materials and equipment for Polish consumer goods industries. Although there were discussions of more loans, negotiations did not make much progress. Another sign of a friendlier atmosphere was the reopening of a Polish consulate in Chicago in October, 1958, and, in return, an American consulate in Poznan.

In addition to these diplomatic efforts, there was a rather remarkable effort on the part of private individuals to ship goods of all sorts to relatives, friends or charitable organizations. A significant contribution to Polish-American relations was also made by the Ford Foundation, which in 1957 established a fund of \$500,000 for the rebuilding of Polish libraries and for fellowships for Polish scholars to visit Western European and American institutions. A similar grant of \$475 million was made by the Rockefeller Foundation.

Undoubtedly there would have been greater efforts made on both diplomatic and private levels if Poland had continued to follow the lines of the October Revolution. But the gradual return of Gomulka into the Soviet orbit provoked an adverse reaction in the Western World. Soviet pressure on Berlin forced a tightening of ranks on both sides of the Iron Curtain, thus further isolating Poland from the West.

From the Soviet point of view, Poland has again been brought into line through Gomulka's consolidation of internal control and through Soviet revival of the threat of a unified Germany and hence of Poland's territorial integrity. Although more freedom is present in Poland than in the other satellites, such liberties have been kept within bounds.

(Continued on page 214)

<sup>2</sup> Sections published in the February, 1959, issue of *Current History*, pp. 107-114.

*Analyzing Yugoslavia's "national Communism," this author states that "Yugoslavia's policy toward the West has not changed markedly" during the latest developments in the "new dispute with the Soviet Union." "American interests in Yugoslav independence remain as high as ever, and the benefit to the West from the new conflict . . . may be very great among the neutral states."*

# Yugoslavia: The State in the Middle

By ROBERT F. BYRNES

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THE LEAGUE of Communists of Yugoslavia has as its primary goal the defense of the Party, the system, and the country and its independence. The League's, or the Party's second goal is to spread the influence of the Yugoslav version of socialism as far as possible within the satellite system of the Soviet Union, among the neutral states and within the Western world, and at the same time to organize the neutral states into a third force or loosely organized group between the Soviet Union and its satellites, on the one hand, and the Western allies, on the other hand.

The bases of Yugoslav policy are the army, the police, and the direct and indirect forms of control which the Party maintains over the state and the economy. Both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union are dictatorships under the control of a single party, but the Yugoslavs have relaxed and decentralized their Party control more effectively than even Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev has done. The Yugoslav redefinition of

socialism, with particular emphasis upon "workers management" and "decentralization," has contributed to improving the morale of Yugoslav workers and peasants and to strengthening the bonds between the people and the Party.

Western aid and Western diplomatic support constitute one of the strong bases of Yugoslavia's independent existence, although this is obviously not a fact to which the Yugoslav leaders frequently refer. While relying on Western aid and assistance to ensure their independence against Soviet and satellite pressure, the Yugoslavs have also maintained an open door to the Soviet Union and have obviously not abandoned hope that the warm relationships which existed between 1953 and 1956 can be re-established.

Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform on June 28, 1948, came as a complete surprise to the Western world and was probably a great shock even to the Yugoslav Communist leaders. However, it was not until late 1949 that they realized that Stalin had indeed discharged them from the Soviet system and that they would have to depend on their own strength and Western assistance to survive in the stormy world ahead. The expulsion was caused by Yugoslav insistence upon maintaining independence, Yugoslav ideas concerning a Balkan federation, and the Bled agreement concluded with Bulgaria on August 4, 1947, with regard to Thrace and Macedonia.

From 1948 through 1953, the Yugoslavs suffered from a Soviet and satellite economic blockade that seriously damaged their economic plans, from heavy propaganda against the Yugoslav party and government, inter-

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ruptions and delays in mail and shipping traffic, sabotage, military maneuvers on Yugoslavia's frontiers, and border excursions and alarms.

### **Soviet-Yugoslav Relations**

After the death of Stalin in March, 1953, a new era in Soviet-Yugoslav relations gradually unfolded. The 1953-1955 period was marked by a general thaw within the Soviet Union, by the so-called New Course within the satellites, and by Soviet propagation of the theory of peaceful coexistence. After two years of slow progress towards reconciliation, the new Soviet leaders, led by Khrushchev, visited Belgrade on May 26, 1955, apologized for Soviet policies against Yugoslavia, and assigned responsibility for the break to head of the MVD Lavrenti Beria. From this visit emerged an agreement for "mutual respect and non-interference" and recognition that "different social systems and different forms of socialist development are the exclusive business" of each state.

The Khrushchev visit to Belgrade led to steps of increasing cooperation and friendship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February, 1956, has been called the Titoist Congress because the Soviet party adopted so many planks from Yugoslav platforms. This was the party congress of de-Stalinization, and the Khrushchev speech in particular seemed to justify everything the Yugoslavs had said and done. In addition, this congress officially gave approval to several Yugoslav theses, especially the doctrine that there are several roads to socialism, the belief that war is not inevitable, and the suggestion that peaceful means can be used to overthrow capitalism.

This congress and its doctrines were sanctified in a sense when Marshal Tito visited the Soviet Union in June, 1956. The declaration signed at the end of Tito's visit seemed to seal the Yugoslav triumph, for it recognized that the Soviet Union had no monopoly on socialism and that relations between the parties should be "equal, frank, and free."

Tito had no sooner signed this declaration and returned to Yugoslavia than troubles

broke out within East Central Europe which mark a turning point in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The Poznan riots in June of 1956 were followed by the successful Polish revolution in October, and by the disastrous Hungarian revolt in October and November. These developments, which many Soviet Communists inevitably attributed to Yugoslav ideology, policy and influence, led to an uneasy period in the relationship between the two Communist states. However, even during this period, Tito was wooed by Soviet leaders, particularly Khrushchev and First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan. He was even invited on occasion to give advice on delicate matters of internal Soviet politics.

### **The Break in 1958**

Throughout 1957 and 1958, relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and its satellites became quite strained. The situation reached the critical point at the celebration in Moscow of the fortieth anniversary of the November Revolution of 1917, when the Yugoslav representatives refused to sign the Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Worker's Parties of the Socialist Countries, a step which inevitably infuriated the Soviet leaders. The Yugoslavs apparently refused to sign this document because it emphasized the leading role of the Soviet Communist party and because of its vigorous attacks on "revisionism," which was ascribed to the Yugoslavs.

This break was widened and deepened when the Yugoslavs early in March, 1958, published the draft of the Ljubljana program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. In this draft program, the Yugoslav Communists summarized what they considered the theoretical and practical improvements they had made on Marxism-Leninism in the previous decade. The draft program in essence described Yugoslavia as the most advanced Socialist state. It lauded Yugoslav decentralization of industry, the new system of "worker self-management," "liquidation" of the bureaucracy, and the "Socialist free market," which the Yugoslavs claimed combined the advantages of a nationalized "planned economy" and those of a capitalistic free market.

These glorifications of Yugoslav theory

and practice irritated the Soviet leaders, but the Yugoslav analysis of the international situation angered them even more. To begin with, the Yugoslav analysis of the development of capitalist society noted the emergence of state capitalism in West European and North American nations and went on to assert that this made very likely the peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism. Even more damaging, however, was the Yugoslav study of the struggle between the two power blocs. The Yugoslav draft program assigned some of the responsibility for the cold war to the Soviet Union and treated the Soviet bloc in the same way it did the Western alliance. This factor was probably crucial for Soviet irritation. (This particular affront was removed from the final version.)

Khrushchev himself at the Twenty-First Soviet Party Congress in January, 1959, said that the essence of the dispute was the Yugoslav effort "to convince everyone that there are in the world two blocs, two military camps." Khrushchev asserted that the Socialist camp cannot be called a camp, but is really a community of equal nations, and that full responsibility for the conflict lies with the United States.

#### **Soviet Policies since 1957**

Yugoslav actions have presented the Soviet leaders with a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, they could hardly tolerate Yugoslav ambitions in the theoretical and practical field because of the potential impact on the satellites and on Communist parties throughout the non-Communist world. Acknowledging unique Yugoslav achievements would have been a major blow to the Soviet claim to leadership of the international Communist movement.

On the other hand, if the Soviet Communists condemned the Yugoslavs for "national Communism," they would be reversing a policy which had developed steadily since 1953 and would strike a blow at a general line of policy they were pursuing throughout the world. Moreover, condemning the Yugoslavs openly might lead to a break as disastrous as that of 1948.

In this situation, the Soviet Communists hesitated for some time before they made their ultimate decision; even then, Soviet policy remained both unclear and irresolute,

shrewdly leaving with the Soviet and the Yugoslav leaders room for maneuver. Throughout 1957, even before the conference in Moscow in November, the Soviet press attacked "revisionism," generally labeling it a Yugoslav heresy. As time proceeded, the attack became more firm and vigorous. Thus, by the summer of 1958, the Yugoslavs were being treated as heretics, and they were later denounced as traitors to socialism and lackeys of the United States. Khrushchev himself, on November 10, 1958, in a speech at the Moscow Sports Palace, denounced the Yugoslavs for "undermining and dividing activity" among the Communist states. At the same time, Khrushchev described the Yugoslav economy as one which was stagnant, if not regressive, and he claimed that the Yugoslav standard of living was lower than that in any of the states of East Central Europe.

The most striking Soviet action has been the Soviet government's decision to postpone the credits for \$285 million granted in January and August of 1956 to Yugoslavia for long-term economic development. These credits were postponed unilaterally for five years after the Hungarian revolt in November, 1956, and were postponed until 1969 after the publication of the draft program of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in March, 1958. This Soviet action has been bitterly criticized by the Yugoslavs. However, the Yugoslavs have obtained great pleasure from pointing out the contrast between this Soviet policy and the Soviet foreign aid offensive. They have also keenly ridiculed the Soviet Union for denouncing Yugoslav acceptance of American credits and Yugoslav trade with the West, while at the same time, particularly in view of Mikoyan's visit to the United States in January, 1959, the Russians are seeking American trade and credits.

#### **The Soviet Bloc**

The Chinese Communists have been the most vigorous critics of Yugoslavia in the past two years. They have called the Yugoslavs "hirelings and traitors of capitalism" for receiving Western assistance and they have even reversed the Soviet stand on 1948 by asserting that expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform was eminently justified.

They have even refused to use Yugoslav territory and Yugoslav ports for transportation of their goods into Central Europe.

The Hungarians have been especially vicious in their attacks. Indeed, on June 17, 1958, in the announcement of the execution of Nagy, the Hungarians ascribed responsibility for the Hungarian uprising to the Yugoslavs. The Albanians and Bulgarians have followed closely. Thus, in the fall of 1958, Albania demanded that Kossovo-Metohia be released from Yugoslav control. The Bulgars on their part demanded that Macedonia be made "free."

The new crisis in Soviet-Yugoslav relations raised a paralyzing dilemma for the Poles, who in November, 1956, adopted some of the principal parts of the Yugoslav program and who have been slower than the other states in attacking the Yugoslavs. When Gomulka visited Yugoslavia in September, 1957, he and Tito agreed that "our countries are building socialism, each in its own way, and according to its own conditions." The Poles also agreed on March 28, 1958, to send a delegation to the Yugoslav congress. They cancelled this delegation only on April 18, after the Soviets had refused to send a delegation. The first Polish attack against Yugoslavia was made at Gdansk in June of 1958, and it was moderate. Gomulka, however, has had to follow Soviet leadership, and in November, 1958, in Moscow after the Khrushchev speech, he reiterated the Khrushchev doctrines.

### **The Yugoslav Response**

The Yugoslavs were amazingly quiet under this attack until October, 1958, although Tito admitted that Yugoslavia was "the most frequently attacked country in the world." When they did decide to break silence, they defended Yugoslav economic development. They pointed out that living standards in Yugoslavia were higher than in the Soviet Union, condemned the Soviet Union for the economic blockade of the 1948-1953 period, questioned the statistics used against them, asserted that the Polish and Hungarian revolts both proved the correctness of their policies, and defended their new doctrines.

Above all, the Yugoslavs have made public the record of their economic and political

relations with the Soviet Union and the data they have collected concerning developments within Communist China. The principal target for this campaign has been the neutral countries of the world, in particular Egypt, Indonesia, Ceylon, Sudan, India, Burma, Ethiopia and the United Arab Republic, which Tito visited in December, 1958-January, 1959. While he did not strongly criticize the Soviet Union publicly, he gave the leaders of the neutral states a great deal of information about the ways in which Soviet economic assistance has been managed with regard to Yugoslavia and the dangers involved in close relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China.

We should note that Yugoslavia has kept the door open for closer relations with the Soviet Union. The Yugoslav answers to the Soviet attacks were delayed, and they have been soft. Tito has not responded in such a way as to make reconciliation difficult or impossible, and Khrushchev himself (though not the Soviet press) has not made statements which would make reconciliation impossible.

Moreover, Yugoslavia has continued to support the main lines of Soviet foreign policy. It supported the Soviet action against Hungary in the United Nations in September, 1957. In October, 1957, Yugoslavia recognized the East German government, although this meant a break with West Germany. Yugoslavia has consistently supported Soviet disarmament policy in the United Nations. It still advocates the admission of Communist China into the United Nations. It even praised the new Soviet policy on Berlin as "constructive initiative."

### **Yugoslavia and the West**

Throughout the new dispute with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia's policy toward the West has not changed markedly. Tito "refused" additional American military aid in 1958, but this policy was adopted only after the need for this assistance had disappeared and after American congressional discussion had indicated renewal was unlikely. Economic aid, in the form of credits, is sought and accepted, as before, and Yugoslavia relies still, though quietly, on the shield of Western diplomatic and military support against any possible Soviet action. At the

same time, as if to "prove" his independence, Tito ostentatiously supports Soviet policies and criticizes Western actions, such as intervention in Lebanon in the early summer of 1958.

American interests in Yugoslav independence remain as high as ever, and the benefit to the West from the new conflict, particularly from the Soviet decision to "postpone" credits to Yugoslavia until 1969, may be very great among the neutral states. Moreover, the existence of a Communist state which grants some restricted freedoms to its peoples and which is at least experimenting with a freer economy offers the Soviet Union a competition from which free people everywhere, and unfree people as well, can only benefit. In other words, the United States should continue to assist Yugoslavia in whatever ways are necessary to maintain its independence. Above all, if the Cyprus issue should now be resolved, we should aid any Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish effort to create a new Balkan federation.

### Conclusion

The second Soviet-Yugoslav dispute is not ideological. Most of the changes which the Soviet Communists now criticize as "national Communism" were made between 1948 and 1955 and were in effect when the Soviet

leaders made their pilgrimage to Belgrade. Moreover, Yugoslavia was receiving economic and military assistance from the United States before and during the years of reconciliation, with no Soviet complaints. The conflict derives from Yugoslavia's continuing refusal to accept Soviet leadership, from Yugoslavia's analysis of and participation in international politics, and from Yugoslavia's separate path to socialism, which creates a rival for the Soviet system, a rival with lures for the rest of the world that weaken the attractiveness of the Soviet model.

Although the conflict is fundamental, the door to reconciliation has been held open on both sides; however the Chinese Communists would be most embarrassed by a new reconciliation. The hazards of reconciliation with the thorny rebel are great, however, though not so great as the dangers which would develop from even greater pressure against Yugoslavia. Thus, Soviet-Yugoslav relations are likely for some time to remain on a stormy, bickering plateau, with the possibilities for reviving some sort of collaboration greater than those for descending to even more perilous quarreling. In this situation, we should continue to aid Yugoslavia to maintain its independence and to strengthen its ties with its free neighbors.

*(Continued from page 209)*

The Hungarian Revolution was a painful lesson to the satellites.

As far as Poland itself is concerned, most of the gains of the October Revolution have been lost, but much of importance has been retained, particularly contact with the West. Although Russophobia is as marked as ever, Communist power has been reasserted and Soviet troops continue to be stationed on Polish soil. Soviet influence has similarly been strengthened in the face of possible German reunification.

For the West, Poland constitutes the largest of the satellites with the greatest internal tension. Poland holds a strategic position between the Soviet Union and East Germany and is the most important industrial producer of Eastern Europe. Had Poland withdrawn from the Soviet orbit, this would have had a most important political effect on many nations of the world that are attempting to

appraise communism and its effect on a nation. That Poland has not done so is also significant.

At the moment it seems doubtful that the Western world can expect much success in getting Soviet troops out of Poland. Poland is much too important to the Russians both militarily and economically to withdraw troops without at least similar troop withdrawals from West Germany and a drastic revision of NATO.

But the West can gain significant advantages in the cold war by continuing economic aid to Poland and by encouraging mutual exchange and contacts. Most of all, Poland would welcome assurance that she is not entirely at the mercy of the Soviet Union where territorial integrity and fear of German invasion are concerned. Without some such assurance, there is little hope that Poland can become much else than a dutiful satellite.



What were the negative and positive forces that under Communist rule influenced the attitudes of Czechoslovakia's people and shaped the domestic and foreign policies of its regime? According to this author, negative forces work to keep "people's emotional reactions under control."

## Czechoslovakia: Moscow's Model Satellite

By VACLAV E. MARES

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**I**N THE summer and fall of 1956, when Poland and Hungary were in revolutionary turmoil, it seemed certain that the next in turn would be Czechoslovakia. A nation which, under T. G. Masaryk's leadership, was a model of parliamentary democracy in that part of the world, was expected to use the first opportunity to change the conditions of living forced upon it by the Communist rule.

Contrary to what nearly everybody expected, no serious unrest in that year was reported in Czechoslovakia. There were some signs of discontent, especially among intellectual groups—students and writers—but they never became the catalysts of a

wider popular movement. Only once before, in June, 1953, workers demonstrated *en masse* for several days against the regime, when a newly promulgated monetary reform wiped out their forced savings and reduced their real incomes. The revolt remained localized in a few industrial centers and eventually petered out without forcing the government to make any change in its monetary policy.

The grumbling because of material discomforts, the longing for more individual freedom, the dissatisfaction of whole economic groups about some unfair treatment—all these and other signs of discontent were reported from Czechoslovakia as often as from other satellite countries. But what was obviously missing in Czechoslovakia was some strong emotional motivation to unify scattered negative forces and to activate them into a positive revolutionary spirit.

Matters were quite different in Poland and in Hungary. Russophobia, as it existed in Hungary since Kossuth's days and in Poland since Peter the Great's rule, never found any place either in the spiritual content or in the emotional expression of Czech nationalism. Czechs were, traditionally, Russophiles. During its short stay on Czechoslovakia's territory, the Red Army somehow marred the friendly Czech concept of the good-natured "big brothers" in the East; still an action against the Russians or against the regime that they helped to install would never have received that powerful support of accumulated national hatred in Czechoslovakia that it received in Poland and in Hungary.

Vaclav E. Mares received his Ph.D. from Charles University in Prague. Before World War II he worked with the coal, steel and cement industries in Central Europe and taught industrial economics at the Mining Academy and at the College of Business in Prague. After the war he was sent with Czechoslovakia's delegation to the first General Assembly of the United Nations in New York and stayed in the United States in the capacity of commercial counselor with the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington, D. C. He resigned from this post after the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and later joined the faculty of the Pennsylvania State University.

Moreover, several subsidiary forces that pushed thwarted national pride into explosion, especially in Hungary, were not present in Czechoslovakia. Its people were not irritated daily by the sight of the occupation army; neither did they feel economic exploitation as intensely as did the Hungarians because of their reparation deliveries; nor did they feel hurt in their national aspirations because of imposed border changes as did the Hungarians when—after they had unwisely placed all their revisionist hopes on Hitler's card—they had to return all their territorial gains at the end of the war.

Thus the Czechs were lacking—fortunately for them—the emotional motivation that sets off the fuses and causes the explosion. Moreover, they were richer by one experience—Munich—that must have worked upon their minds as a powerful brake. With vivid recollections of that painful emotional upset that hit, in one way or another, nearly every Czech and Slovak family, they were much more realistic in their expectations of some help from the West. To the people of those countries which—like Hungary and Poland—temporarily benefited from it, Munich remained an abstract concept, just the name of another international conference. To the people of Czechoslovakia who became its victims, Munich remained forever a glaring warning signal. It taught them to evaluate soberly all foreseeable gains and losses before engaging in risky undertakings.

Furthermore, no leader for a nationwide opposition movement was available in Czechoslovakia. Those from the Left—like Slansky or Clementis who could have played, perhaps, the role of a Nagy or of a Gomulka—were purged and executed in 1952. Those from the Center and from the Right, who had gone into political emigration earlier, were discredited at home by the lack of foresight and resistance that they had shown before and during the critical days of February, 1948.

Thus the country kept all the appearances of an island of calm while waves of revolts were beating high all around. Its people by their inertness surprised many of their friends. Its political refugees in all parts of the free world, when pressed by inquisitive questions, found it difficult to interpret the attitudes of their countrymen at home.

Aside from these negative forces which kept people's emotional reactions under control, other factors played into the hands of the Red regime in Czechoslovakia. The Russian development (from Stalin's one man rule to Malenkov-Bulganin-Khrushchev's collective leadership and back to Khrushchev's one man rule), had its parallel in Czechoslovakia. Klement Gottwald's one man rule was followed, after his death in 1953, by a triumvirate of Zapotocky, Siroky and Novotny. This trend, however, reversed itself in Prague earlier than in Moscow. When Zapotocky died in the fall of 1957, collective leadership became a two man rule in which, however, the bulk of the power fell into the hands of Novotny. While keeping the office of the Communist party's first secretary, Novotny became the country's third Communist president.

### **Zapotocky's Presidency**

Some rapprochement between the government and the governed could be observed in Czechoslovakia during Zapotocky's tenure of the presidential office, 1953–1957. As an old trade union organizer, fighter and boss, he was sure of a wide personal support outside the party machine—a support which his partners lacked. He spent the war in Nazi concentration camps which added a good mark both to his party and national records. The fact that he did not combine in his hands the function of the state president and that of the party chief was, undoubtedly, also in his favor in the public eye. Not burdened by party functions and with a good record of political accomplishments (it was his trade union militia that assured the success of the coup in 1948) he did not need to pretend in his seventies that he was a hard-working president. In public he liked to appear relaxed and jovial. Among the Communist leaders of the country he was the only one with some claim to popularity. The regime was fortunate to have him in the presidential office in the tumultuous year 1956.

Officially, the regime did not move far from the old party line in its domestic policy. It did not restore to good graces either Slansky or Clementis, or any of their co-defendants who were hanged for alleged Titoism and espionage. The three who received life sentences—London, Hajdu and

Loebl—have been given reprieves, but little has been publicly said on the subject. Only a year ago at the annual meeting of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, J. Lenart, from the Communist party's presidium, said in his address: "The Academy must become the coordinating center of all scientific activities and must not permit liberalism in scientific work."

### Signs of Relaxation

However, while sticking officially to its guns, the regime recently showed less dogmatism in practical matters, more leniency for ideological dissidents in non-political fields, and more interest in gaining public favor by consumer-minded actions. Some examples will illustrate this tacit new course of policy.

Shortly after the public repudiation of liberalism in scientific work by the top ranking Communist party officer, one could read in the editorial part of the newspaper *Pravda* in Bratislava the following rhetorical questions addressed to the faculty members of the Slovakian institutions of higher learning:

Comrades, university professors, five years ago we sent you young socialists, and now, five years later, you have returned to us young liberals. How have you done it? What influenced these young people, these future teachers? What have you done to these talented sons and daughters of working parents?

No attempt was made by the journal to answer these questions nor to call for punishment of the "saboteurs" on the faculty.

Similar concessions to straight-jacketed academic freedom could be heard from Prague. University students were allowed to become more articulate. On different occasions they could freely air their grievances and protest not only against unpopular study requirements and other university rules, but also against the lack of student exchange programs, against the elimination of certain books from their libraries and against the interference of the state bureaucracy into university matters. Once, in 1956, a few arrests after one such parade reminded the students that there were certain political limits for their regained academic freedom. Since then, they never again publicly demanded the dropping of the requirement that every student must take and successfully pass the course in Marxism-Leninism.

Symptoms of a certain relaxation were admitted also by individual faculty members to occasional visitors. They confirmed that it is now easier to stay aloof from political life. Only the young generation is expected to show an active interest and approval of the regime's policies. Those who get some broader national recognition as scientists, artists or sportsmen, seem to be left alone. Works of some well known Czech artists who did not conform to the requirements of "socialistic realism" have reappeared at public shows after an absence of ten years.

### Improving Living Conditions

Although man's heart does not listen only to his stomach, a full stomach usually affords better protection than an empty one against explosive emotional reactions. The Czech Red regime seems to have kept this well in mind. It never needed to fight with hungry workers rioting in the streets, as the Polish regime had to do in Poznan. After the rebellions that followed the Poznan uprising, Moscow even gave to the Czech regime its permission to revise the Five Year Plan to allow for more consumer goods. The Soviet Union helped with larger supplies of raw materials, not only of iron ore and metals, but also of hides, wool and other consumer goods materials. Thus the production increases reported by Czechoslovakia in 1957 for clothing, leather articles, sewing machines and bicycles were among the highest of that year.

Far less satisfactory was the development of Czechoslovakia's agriculture. The planned annual rate of growth for the period 1956–1960 was set at five per cent for plant and at six per cent for animal production, but the actual output figures remained far behind these goals. This development coincided with a new farm collectivization drive which became one of the main features of Czechoslovakia's second Five Year Plan. The drive was supported by increased economic advantages given to cooperatives as compared with private farms. Among them were lower obligatory delivery quotas, better supplies of seed and fertilizer, higher priorities on and lower charges for the services of machine tractor stations, and easier access to bank credit. The drive was a success for the government. From the beginning of 1956

to the end of 1958 it brought the share of agricultural land under the control of co-operatives from 25 to more than 50 per cent.

The ideological motivation under which this renewed collectivization drive was publicized fell somehow to the side of the road. It seems so at least from the fact that the largest increase in the number of cooperative units was in the category where land remains the private property of the members, where families retain the right of inheritance of the land, and where the members combine their operations and distribute the income not only according to the work performed but also according to the area of land owned. Neglecting Marx' theory of surplus value, the regime made another ideological concession in order to secure the success of its policy. It did so with two practical and urgent goals in mind. One was the badly needed increase in agricultural output, the other was the pressing shortage of manpower in industry which the regime hoped to relieve by the release of half-employed people from small family farms.

#### **The Economy's Critical Bottleneck**

All the regime's actions aimed at securing more industrial labor never fully caught up with the rate at which labor requirements were growing. They are not likely to catch up with it soon. The three million Sudeten Germans who had been unwisely expelled in 1945 could only partly be replaced by the transfers and immigration of Slovaks and Bulgarian families into industrial districts of Bohemia and Moravia. Not even the drafting of women—voluntary, yet with tempting fringe benefit inducements for the family—could fill the gap. It is interesting to note that women made up 78 per cent of the whole increase of the non-agricultural labor force in the 1950–1955 period.

In addition, the regime, which needed to keep the people in a cooperative mood, occasionally had to take or tolerate other actions which, with their side-effects, offset its efforts on the labor front. Thus, in spite of the effect that it has upon absenteeism, the regime could not avoid the granting of higher sick-leave benefits; it could not prevent an increase in side-line occupations such as private repair work, small building, or garden farming; it had to allow increases in workers'

incomes even when it knew that such improvements in family incomes lessen the need for marginal labor to take up employment.

The chronic labor shortage, along with the slow growth of the energy supply basis, is the most critical bottleneck of Czechoslovakia's economy. In view of these two serious handicaps, the planned rate of growth of eight to ten per cent per year seems to be rather unrealistic. Under these conditions, a rate of growth of four to five per cent per year would be a good achievement.

#### **Relations Within The Soviet Bloc**

There has been no change in recent years in policy along the Prague-Moscow line. While based primarily on the local Communist party's subservience to the mother party in Moscow, this policy gets some popular support from those who are disturbed by the fear of a possible German revenge. They are haunted by the idea of the three million dispossessed and expelled Sudeten Germans who have not yet forgotten their losses; they wonder what would happen if these former countrymen arrive some day and, backed by a unified Germany, present some compensation or revision claims; they ask themselves how could their country then reject such claims without having at least one great power's support? Realistically weighing their political possibilities, they believe that they can expect such support only from the Soviet Union.

The Red regime knows of the people's misgivings and apprehensions and uses the "German threat" as the skeleton in the cupboard; it presents this to the public whenever it needs acquiescence for some unpopular step dictated by membership in the Soviet bloc.

Czechoslovakia's relations with the other countries of the Soviet bloc in Europe developed in an atmosphere of Moscow-imposed friendliness along the lines of mutual economic needs. Foreign trade figures illustrate this. Between 1948 and 1957, while Czechoslovakia's trade with Western Europe stayed on a level of only 60 to 80 per cent of its 1948 dollar value and while its trade with overseas countries in the same period never increased by more than 50 per cent, its trade with the East-European trade area increased by 200 per cent. With this threefold increase in total trade figures there was a fourfold



increase in machinery exports. During the first Five Year Plan, 1951–1955, most of these exports went to the Soviet Union, but from 1956 on they were diverted more and more to other countries of the Soviet, and also of the neutral blocs.

The Council for Mutual Economic Aid, COMECON, recently assumed a new role. It came into being in 1949 as Molotov's reaction to the Marshall Plan but ran out of steam as soon as the news about its establishment fulfilled its propaganda effect. It has now been rejuvenated and has become a platform for the coordination of long-term planning among the European members of the Soviet bloc. It took upon itself the task of carrying out the policy which Khrushchev outlined in an interview with Hungarian journalists in July, 1957, when he said:

We already said a long time ago that a better co-operation should be established between our countries. It is impossible to have developed everything everywhere simultaneously. Unfortunately we have often spoken in vain. . . . Capitalist experts have found out that it is mass production which renders production cheap and economic. We Marxists, too, have to see the importance of this problem. The sooner and the better we develop the division of labor between our countries, the greater will our economics be. . . .

Inter-satellite specialization became COMECON's number one task. Next in importance is the expansion of the satellites' fuel and power basis. Other tasks entrusted to or planned for COMECON are: a multi-lateral payment scheme with the Russian State Bank as inter-satellite clearing house; standardization of some 600 different types of machinery; mechanization of the timber industry; geological research; free exchange of patents; exchange of specialists; unification of the freight tariff; integration of the road transport into the general transportation system; coordination of transportation on inland waterways; the use of the Danube River for hydro-electric development; the construction of high-voltage transmission lines connecting all satellites; the construction of a pipeline from Baku through the Ukraine and Poland to East Germany. Czechoslovakia, as the most industrialized of the bloc partners, has a vital interest in many of these projects. Therefore, it is one of COMECON's most active members.

Czechoslovakia, with the highest capital accumulation in the bloc, helped on different occasions to finance its partners' needs. As far back as 1950, it gave credit to Eastern Germany for the purchase of footwear in the former Bata factories. The same year it gave credit to Poland for the purchase of equipment for power stations, coke and cement factories. Such credits grew to much higher figures and longer repayment periods in 1957. It was only with the help of such credits that the Czech regime was able to convince the new regimes in Poland and in Hungary to resume their deliveries of coal, bauxite and other materials as the preceding regimes had done. These deliveries had been discontinued after the rebellions.

Even if the work done under the aegis of COMECON has so far been mainly in the nature of planning for the future, there is no doubt that a determined effort is under way to co-ordinate the economic life of the European Soviet bloc and to attain the greatest possible degree of self-sufficiency. It may take some time before COMECON's efforts begin to bear fruit, but they will eventually benefit everybody in an area that had never integrated its resources and that therefore always lagged behind Western Europe in development and living standards.

### Relations with Yugoslavia

Before the war, relations among the various national groups in Central and Eastern Europe were usually based on cool, rational evaluation of mutual security and economic interests. There was, however, one exception. At least one inter-country relationship in that area was never marred by border incidents, minority troubles or revisionist claims, and was based on long-standing cultural contacts that provided warm popular support for the political friendship of the governments of the two countries. I refer here to the relationship between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Thousands of Yugoslav students came yearly for their graduate training to the universities and technical institutes in Prague, in Příbram, in Brno, in Bratislava; and yearly thousands of Czechs and Slovaks left their land-locked country to vacation on the Dalmatian shores of the Adriatic.

It is a tragic irony that these two countries, whose people in the past developed fruitful

co-operation in many fields, are ruled now by regimes that are not on speaking terms. The reconciliation attempts by the Kremlin never produced any genuine relaxation in Prague-Belgrade relations. To be a Titoist has ceased in Prague to be an offense for which people are hanged, as it was in the time of the Slansky trial, but it remains a synonym for a most despicable attitude. Still last December, the daily *Borba* in Belgrade accused the Prague regime of being the most intensive loud-speaker of the Moscow-directed hate campaign against Yugoslavia.

### Relations with China

In its relations with China and its Far Eastern satellites, the Prague regime followed Moscow's lead closely. In its institutions of higher learning it established scholarships for Far Eastern students whose great numbers on the grounds and in the halls of the Charles University provide an unusual sight for those who visit their old Alma Mater in Prague.

Czech engineering products, rails and other transportation equipment were sold to China even before the war. This trade has been resumed and in this case also Czechoslovakia has to finance, by long-term credit, deliveries of lathes, boring machines, forging presses, cement mills equipment, water power stations, leather tanning and shoe machinery. Agreements concerning these deliveries run until 1962.

Those who like to read between the lines found very interesting the performance of the Czech press when it had to interpret to the public the news about the commune movement in China. Obviously in fear of the distrust that it would create among Czech farmers who were still undecided whether or not to join a co-operative, the press presented the news as a small item without comment. No word of evaluation, no word of criticism, no word of approval was uttered about this Chinese way to communism. Only when answering inquiries from some disturbed readers, the press tried to assure them that the Chinese were not indulging in Left-wing revisionism, but were building socialism under their own peculiar conditions.

### Relations with the Neutrals

As a major producer of heavy industrial

equipment, Czechoslovakia assumed an important role in the technical assistance program by which Russia tries to secure political influence among the neutral underdeveloped countries. Czech participation in various development projects was reported from Egypt, Syria and Afghanistan. Czech equipment for sugar and oil refineries was or is being delivered to other members of the Arab bloc. As for weapons, the Czechs first equipped the Israeli army, but after the East-West zones of interests in the Middle East were clearly established, they took care only of the war material needs of the Arab bloc. Whenever a new nation or a new regime is established in one of the former colonial territories, Czechoslovakia is always among the first to recognize it. This was the case with Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia and Guinea. A Czech trade mission usually appears soon afterward.

Another rather dubious, "assistance" project for underdeveloped countries is operated by the Czech government in Prague. Under the name of "Institute of Economic Research" this institution offers, among other courses, instruction on how to conduct espionage, industrial sabotage, and guerrilla warfare, or, simply, how to make a revolution. Of its students several hundred are from Asia and Africa, with the largest single group from Algeria; there are also some from the West.

### Relations with the West

Officially, when speaking to the governments of the West, the Czech regime likes to appear as the most militant, the most vigilant, the most forward looking outpost of the world's Communist revolution. However, when speaking to the people of the West, the regime immediately softens its voice and tries to convince them that they need not be frightened. It reminds one of the scene in Smetana's *Bartered Bride*, where a village simpleton, disguised in the skin of a grizzly bear, first tries to scare people and, when they start to flee, calls them back and un-masks himself as their old friend Vashek.

This "old-friend-approach" the Czech regime used last summer when, at the Brussels Fair, it tried to re-introduce itself to the Western public. Trying to capitalize on the high prewar reputation of Czech and Slovak

craftsmen, the regime used their high quality products in artistic exhibits which, with added light effects, impressed the Fair's visitors. All was arranged with great skill and good taste. The high official recognition that the Czech exhibit received was well-deserved.

The establishment of the European Common Market is of serious concern to Czechoslovakia. The gradual elimination of duties among the members of the Common Market will narrow the openings for sales by non-member countries within that area. Western European markets for manufactures traditionally provided Czechoslovakia with a credit balance of trade which, in recent years, the regime used for the financing of its exports on credit to the Eastern trade area. As a member of GATT, Czechoslovakia was not hurt by the first tariff reduction which was made last January, benefits of which were extended to all GATT members. However, its trade interests will be hurt as soon as tariff reductions are limited to the Common Market members only. This is the reason why no favorable comment could be read in the Czech press about the Common Market development and why it was interpreted only as an economic extension of imperialist Nato policies.

#### Relations with the United States

What is true of Czechoslovakia's "tough" official attitude to the West is doubly true of its official attitude toward the United States. The disparaging and vilifying statements of the press are not surprising especially when its reporters must dampen an occasional upsurge of pro-American feelings of the people. More astonishing are such slanderous official statements as, for example, the one made last September by Jiri Hendrych, chief ideologist of the Communist party. Speaking on the occasion of the twentieth commemoration of Munich, he said:

We are fully justified in noting the revival and rapid strengthening of Germany's imperialism and militarism . . . under American patronage. . . . Nothing can alter the fact that, as Hitler was the aggressor 20 years ago, so is American imperialism today.

Thus the Czech regime today officially interprets American foreign policy.

While the relations of the Czech Red regime with the United States were never too warm, it was mainly during the Korean War that an open hostility developed. There were a number of incidents on the economic, political and military front—these last on the Czech-Bavarian border—which were partly the cause and partly the result of this tension. Unsettled claims for nationalized American property in Czechoslovakia, United States seizure of American equipment for a steel rolling mill which was purchased by Czechoslovakia, the Oatis affair, the Field brothers affair, espionage charges against American diplomats and against Czech employees of the American Embassy, American broadcasts to Czechoslovakia from the Munich transmitter, organized assistance extended by American authorities in Germany to Czech refugees, numerous border incidents on the ground and in the air, American cancellation of the most-favored nation treatment for Czechoslovakia's imports—these were just some of the cases that contributed to the hostile tension which affected the relations between the two countries during most of the 1950's.

Unlike the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia participated, since their foundation, in all the specialized agencies of the United Nations. Its relations to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which have their headquarters in Washington a few blocks from the State Department, disintegrated in 1953. Czechoslovakia did not cooperate in the executive bodies of the two institutions. It declined to abide by the Monetary Fund's regulations concerning consultations on foreign exchange restrictions, it refused to supply the Fund with required information on its trade and finance and it refused payments on its subscription to the World Bank. It finally was requested to withdraw from both institutions. Czechoslovakia remained, however, in all the other specialized agencies of the United Nations—International Labor Office, Food and Agriculture Organization, UNESCO, and so forth—in which some of the other Moscow bloc members also participate.

Are there symptoms in sight that would point to some improvement in Czechoslovakia's relations with the United States? With some optimism one could, perhaps, find some

such symptoms. The frequency of border incidents, of uncovered espionage activities, and of complaints about unsettled claims has definitely decreased; cultural exchange—visits of artists, sportsmen, but no students yet—has slightly increased; willingness has been shown to accept some compromise settlement of outstanding claims, to clear the way for more trade and, perhaps, for some credit. As *The New York Times* of February 3, 1959, announced, United States officials have confirmed that there appears to be a good chance for settlement of long-standing financial differences with Prague. According to the same report, even the re-activation of the most-favored-nation clause is being considered. This would be an American concession of high importance to the Czech regime, which needs to expand its market here to offset the loss which it has to face in Europe after the Common Market removes tariff barriers among its Western European members.

#### American Policy Towards Czechoslovakia

Would such a softening of American policy towards the present regime in Czechoslovakia be in line with American security considerations? Would it be in line with American policy towards the other members of the Soviet bloc? There is no doubt that for American interests in that area a Benes-type, a Tito-type, or, at least, a Gomulka-type regime in Czechoslovakia would be preferable to the regime of a certain Antonin Novotny. But would it be realistic to hope for such a change? In case of war or of some radical change in Russia, anything is of course possible. Novotny could then be replaced by an Otto von Habsburg or by a Petr Zenkl, by a Prussian or by a Russian Governor—depending on how far back one would like to set the clock of history. This would be in the hands of the great power that presided when a new Central European system was established. Provided, however, that all goes peacefully, no more than the normal turnover in leaders, with no revolutionary change in policies is to be expected.

Why then should the American government show any benevolence to the present Czech regime? It seems to me that there could be several reasons. First, the United States has always given its support to devi-

ationists in the Communist camp. It was one of the purposes of this article to show that, without advertising it, the Czech regime started *via facti* to tolerate and even support in its public life many practices that would have been branded as "bourgeois deviationism" four or five years ago.

Second, with the approaching urgency to find some compromise settlement for the Berlin and the German problem, reduction in friction points with the Soviet bloc seems to be advisable for the United States. Why continue, officially, to speak of a liberation policy towards the satellites and irritate in this way their regimes when, since the Hungarian Revolt, nobody in the world believes in it anyway?

#### Czech Popular Support

Finally, the government of the United States should re-examine how much actual popular support is presently behind the Red regime and its policies in Czechoslovakia. Lack of such backing in the early years of its era was certainly a good reason for the United States' reserved attitude. But this was at a time when chaotic changes in the political and economic system of the country made living conditions most trying to everyone, and when all, including those who voted for the Communists in the last free elections, in despair expected change either by war or, perhaps, by some act of God.

Today, however, the situation seems to have changed considerably. With the exception of the class which suffered under the steam roller of social revolution—the former capitalists, entrepreneurs, rentiers—people feel materially more comfortable, some of them better than they ever felt before, and some, at least, better by comparison with the early years of the Communist rule. Some enjoy certain minor economic freedoms that have been reinstated. They are encouraged by credits to undertake private construction, they can buy certain goods on installments, and if they open a so-called purpose savings account, they can even hope to buy a car if they accumulate savings for paying the full price of the car in cash. They enjoy free health service, cheap factory canteens, vacations at bargain prices in holiday hostels, and other attributes of the Communist welfare state. They make it emphatically clear in



conversation that they would never like to part with them. Intellectuals, especially those who were active in the T. G. Masaryk era, remember those days nostalgically when they speak of the atmosphere in which they have to work presently. But they mostly admit that the party pressure is now milder and that a certain exchange of opinions is now tolerated which would have been unthinkable a few years ago.

Politically, people show interest in world affairs, but in domestic affairs they prefer to abstain from discussion, unless they are members of a militant pro- or anti-Communist group. After having dreamed first of some early political change, they seem now to have accepted, rationally, their role in the present constellation of world powers. They seem inclined to give free hand to their government in this respect, provided that it takes care of their material needs at least as well as it has so far and that, in other respects, it leaves them alone. What many are still missing is the former easy access to a passport which would allow them again, as before the war, to go for some shopping to Vienna, for recreation to the Yugoslav Adriatic, or for intellectual stimulation to some of the Western capitals. Should this cease to be an exclusive privilege for a few of the political élite, many still mentally in opposition would probably accept the situation as the best under present conditions.

American visitors who have had the opportunity to talk with common, uneducated people in Czechoslovakia are amazed by the strong sentimental attachment which still exists in their hearts for the United States in spite of persistent anti-American propaganda. Also, and in spite of Munich, the people's interest in the West European democracies is high. But they seem to know by now how much support they can expect from their Western friends. Even if they could, they would probably not fight for a political system in which they once believed so strongly but which let them down so badly on two occasions in the last 20 years. For the sake of their security they seem to be resigned to Moscow's patronage even at the price of accepting with it, at least in appearance, Moscow's political religion. It is not the first time in their long history that, for reasons of expediency, the Czechs have had

to worship gods in which they do not believe.

The Prague regime seems to be aware of these mental reservations and shows some tolerance for them. With the help of the vast capital equipment inherited from the sacrificed generation, a new middle class is forming fast—much faster than in the other satellites where the capital accumulation process is only at its beginning. The regime has learned a lesson. It has learned that a country which once reached the level of political and economic development that Czechoslovakia reached before 1938 can not be de-kulakized forever. The Czech regime must make a compromise with this political reality. The anticipation of this process, which could ultimately bring the East and West closer together, seems to me to be another worthy consideration when shaping American policy towards Czechoslovakia.

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*Author's Note:* Statistical figures used, and references to trends in figures made in this article, are taken from, or based on, the 1957 *Economic Survey of Europe* published by the United Nations, Geneva, in 1958.

Press quotations from Czech, Slovak, and Yugoslav newspapers are partly my translations from the original source, and are partly taken from such reliable secondary sources as *The New York Times*, the magazine *East Europe* published in New York, and the magazine *Ost-Probleme* published in Bonn.

Information about the attitudes, reasoning and feelings of the people in Czechoslovakia I collected last summer and fall. It was my pleasant duty to serve as lecturer on the *Arosa Sun*, a ship chartered by the Council on Student Travel for the transportation of student groups to and from Europe. Many of those who were on the ship with me—students, tour leaders and individual passengers—planning to visit Czechoslovakia during their stay in Europe, were kind enough to help me with assembling this information. I gave them certain typical questions and asked them to use such questions in their individual contacts while there. I collected the answers they received on my return trip, or in writing, or at the annual fall meeting of the Council on Student Travel in New York. It was the result of this privately organized "Gallup Poll" which provided me with the basis for my statements concerning the present attitudes of the Czechs.

*Discussing Finnish neutrality and "peace and friendship toward all," this author states that "It would be misleading to suggest that Finland, free to choose and not exposed to so-called outside 'pressures,' would have preferred any foreign policy other than that of friendship and cordiality toward the U.S.S.R. However, as clearly and anxiously as that policy has been defined and pursued since the war, it has not been fully successful in convincing Moscow of the good faith of Finland."*

## Continuing Finnish Neutrality

By JOHN H. WUORINEN

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FINLAND'S foreign policy since the last war, and during the years of the cold war in particular, stands out as one of the relatively few simple and easily understood aspects of a Europe in which travail and uneasiness have been the unavoidable consequences of the East-West conflict.

The reasons are not far to seek. In an age in which foreign policy pronouncements and diplomatic communications are all too often designed to mislead and to conceal objectives, Finnish commitments in foreign affairs have spelled a plain and uncomplicated purpose. That purpose has been—the same applies also to Finland's sister nations of Scandinavia—peace and friendship toward all and no involvement in the disputes or conflicts of the Great Powers. Finland's determination to follow this policy and no other was strikingly illustrated as long ago as December, 1935, when the Finnish Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution declaring that the foreign policy of the nation was identical with that of the other peace-loving democracies of the North. The Scandinavian neutral area included Finland as well as Sweden, Norway and Denmark.

This resolution was intended to define with

all possible clarity a policy of "friendship toward all and entangling alliances with none." The actual policy followed until 1939 did not suffice to keep the nation out of war. Finland became in fact the first of the Scandinavian states to fall victim to Big Power aggression (November, 1939–March, 1940), only to be followed by Denmark and Norway which fell under Hitler's onslaught in April, 1940. Ultimately, Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in June, 1941, led to a renewal of the Russo-Finnish war. It continued until an armistice brought the fighting to an end in September, 1944.

The post-war years have witnessed—to state the obvious—a profound change in the European continent. For nearly a decade and a half, the U.S.S.R. has stood in the very heart of Europe. At no time since 1945 has it been possible to assume, in view of the situation in the satellite nations and the posture of the Soviet Union in Germany, that the U.S.S.R. will voluntarily withdraw or can be dislodged from the areas that have come to mark the most impressive advance westward so far achieved by the Kremlin-led Communist cause. This situation (some aspects of which relating to Scandinavia and the Baltic area were discussed in these columns only four years ago in February, 1955) remains the dominant foreign relations factor in the Northern and East European area. Nothing suggests that it is likely to change in the near future.

Finland's position during the years of the cold war has been and is unique. The reasons are many. Some of them are subtle and

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others are obvious. Some reach into the distant past and others are of recent origin. Outstanding among them is the fact that while Finland was defeated in the war and had to accept an armistice and peace terms dictated by the U.S.S.R., the country escaped military occupation. It likewise escaped a "made in Moscow" Communist regime, and was able to carry on after 1945 on the basis of a pre-war republican constitution and democratic institutions.

Another general factor must be noted in passing. It goes a long way toward explaining the Finns' resolve to resist the Russian invasion in 1939, the remarkable tenacity and success of their fight and their escape from destruction, and their survival as a free people during the trials and tribulations of the past two decades. It is, briefly stated, that Finland's historical past over many centuries has been such as to make its people members of the Northern (Scandinavian) and not of the East European family of nations.

For well over 20 generations the Finns have been a part of the so-called Western culture area. They have therefore long shared in and contributed to developments in what has often been called of late the free world—developments that changed subjects into citizens and transformed the privileges of a favored few into the liberties and freedoms of political and social democracy. There is no doubt that one of the end products of this historical experience was the strength and resolve that enabled the Republic to remain outside the iron curtain and led the great majority of Finns to reject the pretensions of a "people's democracy." Only a free people long schooled in the democratic way of life could have mustered the determination—a determination that could not have been a mere hasty improvisation—to face and overcome the immense difficulties and problems of the years since 1945.

#### Finland and the U.S.S.R.

Among these difficulties and problems those arising from Finland's relations with the U.S.S.R. have been the most ominous. They have grown directly out of World War II or have been defined by the circumstances and consequences of Soviet policies and purposes during the cold war period.

A brief look at the recent past will give clearer perspective and suggest pertinent whys and wherefores. Finland's relations with the Soviet Union before 1939 were not close or overly cordial. In 1918, Finnish Reds, aided by Russian Communists, had attempted to overthrow the legal government that had proclaimed Finland independent on December 6, 1917. The attempt failed. The conclusion of the Russo-Finnish peace treaty in 1920 did not remove suspicion and fear of renewed Soviet aggression. In the 1920's and 1930's the activities of Finnish Communists, ever ready to do the bidding of the Kremlin, and the occasional apprehension of Soviet agents, indicated efforts to achieve by indirect means what armed action in 1918 had failed to accomplish.

A new chapter in Finnish-Soviet relations began in the spring of 1938 when the U.S.S.R. proposed, in highly secret discussions initiated by a member of the Soviet legation in Helsinki, that Finland grant her eastern neighbor certain territorial and other concessions. Among them was the acceptance of a mutual assistance pact enabling Soviet forces, in certain contingencies, to use Finnish territory in defense of the U.S.S.R. The proposal was rejected. Finland made it clear at the time that in the event of Big Power conflicts, she would scrupulously follow, together with her Scandinavian neighbors, the policy of complete neutrality that had been stated, with all possible clarity, in the parliamentary resolution of December, 1935.

Undaunted by the failure of the first effort, the Soviets returned to the charge in December, 1938–April, 1939. Finland's response was again negative. Events later in 1939 were to show that the Soviet proposals foreshadowed the Hitler-Stalin pact of August 23, the aggression in Poland in September, the wresting of concessions from the Baltic States in October, and the attempt to conquer Finland during the Winter War (November 30, 1939–March 12, 1940).

The past 18 years have made it abundantly clear that Soviet policy makers viewed with a suspicious eye the position of Finland and that of the European North in general. A few illustrations will suffice. In the spring of 1940, when Finland, Sweden and Norway were considering a pact binding the three

democracies in a common defense league, Moscow chose to see in the plan a potential anti-Soviet alliance. Because of the unyielding attitude of the Kremlin, the idea was abandoned.

In the autumn of 1940, after Norway and Denmark had fallen victims to Nazi invasion, Sweden and Finland considered a mutual defense arrangement. In the course of the preliminary discussions it became clear that some form of political union or federation, and not merely a military pact, would have to be contemplated in order to achieve the defense purposes the two countries considered essential. These plans the U.S.S.R. also interpreted as a potential conspiracy directed against the Soviets. They therefore failed especially because Moscow made it clear that in its view they would mean a clear violation, by Finland, of the March 12, 1940, treaty that had concluded the Winter War.

#### Neutrality Bloc

In 1947-1948, Sweden, Norway and Denmark gave thought to the establishment of a Scandinavian neutrality bloc that would keep Scandinavia clearly outside all Big Power disputes and combinations. Once again the U.S.S.R. saw in the plan only a potential anti-Soviet military scheme. Pressure was brought to bear on Finland—obviously most interested in the security value of a Scandinavian neutrality bloc—to abstain from participating in the discussions. This circumstance was one of the factors that ultimately kept Sweden and Finland out of Nato while Norway and Denmark joined. It is worth noting, incidentally, that Norway and Denmark accepted Nato membership with specific reservations—because of concern over Soviet views regarding the matter—to the effect that no outside Nato forces may be stationed in either country, in time of peace, except by special invitation. This restriction still holds. It means that only native forces may man Nato military installations in the two countries.

In view of Soviet attitudes that had thus been repeatedly defined by the end of the 1940's, it is easy to understand that, as President Urho Kekkonen stated in a radio address December 10 last, the relation of Finland to her eastern neighbor

is the question that dominates everything else in the field of our foreign affairs. This question is our only real foreign relations problem and upon it depends the future of our people.

The problem must be solved, President Kekkonen went on to say, and it can be solved, only if Finland succeeds in convincing the Soviet Union of her unqualified determination to maintain fully cordial and friendly relations with it.

Our foreign policy must never in the future be directed against the U.S.S.R. and we must convince our eastern neighbor that this is our firm resolve.

The attempt thus to convince and persuade has been the main component of Finland's Soviet policy since the war. It was and is the alpha and the omega of the so-called "Paasikivi Line" policy, named for the predecessor of the present President of the Republic. That "line" has been reiterated over the past decade in presidential statements, discussions in Parliament and in newspaper comments. Spokesmen of every political party have subscribed to it. Occasionally the anxiety to underscore the unqualified acceptance of this policy has led to claims and interpretations—not only by Communists—that came close to the absurd implication that Finland had followed an aggressive, war-like, anti-Soviet policy before 1939, that the war of 1939-1944 was a direct consequence of this policy and that Finland is now only atoning for her past errors and sins.

It would be misleading to suggest that Finland, free to choose and not exposed to so-called outside "pressures," would have preferred any foreign policy other than that of friendship and cordiality toward the U.S.S.R. However, as clearly and anxiously as that policy has been defined and pursued since the war, it has not been fully successful in convincing Moscow of the good faith of Finland. The reason has not been lack of effort on Finland's part. The reason appears to be the strange conceptions that Soviet policy makers have permitted to distort existing realities in their pursuit of the goals—large and small—that international communism has set for itself.

The most recent illustration of the complexities of the Finnish situation, and of



Moscow's purposes and procedures in Finland, was the Fagerholm Cabinet crisis that was resolved only after several weeks of difficulty on January 13, 1959.

### The Fagerholm Crisis

The coalition Cabinet headed by Social Democrat K. A. Fagerholm was formed after the July, 1958, elections. It included representatives from all parties except the Communists. The Social Democratic contingent in Parliament had been weakened by an internal schism that ultimately led to the formation of a dissident Socialist group of 13, after which the regular Social Democrats in the legislature numbered only 38. The Communists then stood out as the largest single party with 50 seats, or 25 per cent of the votes in the chamber.

The Fagerholm government, in which the Agrarian J. Virolainen served as foreign minister, soon was exposed to growing difficulties. The Soviet Ambassador in Helsinki left for home and did not return to his post, a circumstance that the Communist critics of the government in particular interpreted as an indication of Soviet displeasure. Meanwhile, trade negotiations with the U.S.S.R. bogged down, and Communist voices were raised in a mounting chorus against the "reactionary" and allegedly "dangerous" policies of the "Rightist" Fagerholm Cabinet. Its foreign policy was especially labelled as irresponsible and destructive of good relations with the U.S.S.R., despite the fact that Fagerholm and other leaders gave repeated assurances that the government and the parties represented in it unqualifiedly considered the "Paasikivi line" as the best and that no deviation from it had at any time been contemplated.

Meantime, the Soviet press made use of charges and allegations voiced by the Communists in Finland. Thus claims and interpretations emanating especially from the domestic Communist opposition and press assumed an ominous aspect, it being clear that the Soviet newspapers spoke with the voice of the government. The result was that the Agrarian party, whose main representative in the Cabinet headed the Foreign Ministry, decided on November 27, 1958, to withdraw from the government. Mr. Fagerholm thereupon offered the resignation

of his Cabinet. He was succeeded by the Agrarian V. J. Sukselainen on January 13, heading a purely Agrarian minority Ministry.

The official Soviet view regarding the Fagerholm ministry and the reasons for its failure were suggested by Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev in Leningrad on January 24, 1959. Khrushchev spoke at a luncheon in honor of President Kekkonen who was "unofficially" visiting Leningrad. He reviewed various aspects of Finnish-Russian relations, and noted that a "freeze" had set in with the coming of the Fagerholm government. "Behind the broad back of Mr. Fagerholm," Khrushchev claimed, "we see Tanner [the veteran Social Democrat and laborite] and his followers who are known for their hatred of the Soviet Union." It was the *composition* of the Cabinet and not any aspect of its policies that was cited as the reason why "we could not expect anything good for our relations" to come from Fagerholm and his colleagues.

The Finnish press was also singled out as a problem.

Certain newspapermen and publications have specialized in anti-Soviet writing and apparently are well paid by reactionary circles and they possibly also enjoy pecuniary support from outside powers that are interested in worsening the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Finland.

The pages of the Soviet press, on the other hand, "contain nothing injurious to the Finnish people or to our relations." If these "negative influences" were to continue in Finland, they would cause "a great deal of damage to our relations." It is to be hoped that the Agrarian government that took office on January 13 "will strengthen the friendship between our two peoples. . . ."

While the evidence at hand does not disclose "pressures" other than those briefly suggested above, it appears clear that the fate of the Fagerholm Cabinet was not decided by the record or achievements of the government. It was decided by attack and coercion traceable in the main to Communist sources and to political opportunists willing to take advantage of the discomfiture of a government exposed to the machinations of foreign as well as domestic opponents. Incidentally, President Kekkonen as well as Foreign Minister Virolainen—both obviously among the top formulators and administra-

tors of Finland's foreign policy—belong to the Agrarian party, that has furnished the nation with a government since January. Yet they were not tarred by the brush that was applied liberally to Social Democrat Fagerholm.

#### Finland and the U.S.

The question naturally arises whether and to what extent Finland's situation and policies are of concern (especially in terms of broadly defined national security considerations) to the United States. Finland's relations with the United States before 1939 were uncomplicated, exceptionally friendly and undisturbed by serious problems or clashing interests. While the exigencies of the war years led to a severance of diplomatic relations in June, 1944, they were re-established in 1945 with a speed that made it plain that only short-range compulsions and war-time circumstances had caused the original breach. In the years after 1945, American economic and other assistance played an important part in enabling Finland successfully to deal with the formidable difficulties that then faced the Republic.

As regards American post-war interest in Finland, it is not necessary to be privy to the thinking and planning in the Pentagon or other Washington agencies to see that it has been part of a policy evolved to meet the threat of Soviet-led communism. Finland has been understood to be in such a precarious position that she requires, in America's own interest, assistance in maintaining republican institutions and a democratic way of life. By 1952, loans amounting to well over \$100 million had been granted, the Fulbright educational exchange program had been extended to include Finland, and arrangements had been made to use Finnish

payments of the "war loan" debt to finance the education of Finnish citizens in the United States and for American educational materials for Finland.

Important as these and other measures have been in enabling Finland to get back on an even keel, they do not suggest that specific American defense commitments in Scandinavia have been extended beyond Nato. Sweden and Finland are both outside the commitment. Yet the question still remains open in Northern Europe: where is the line at which Soviet military aggression will be met? What areas outside Nato (if any) will be defended if need be, and what areas (if any) will be abandoned? Military and moral considerations will give the answer if and when the decisive day comes. Yet it seems that part of the answer is already before us.

Nato is a military alliance designed to discourage and prevent Soviet expansionism. The military readiness and potential embodied in the alliance presumably are sufficient to meet aggression. The non-Nato nations of Scandinavia—Sweden and Finland—represent a relatively impressive potential resource in any defense set-up designed to serve as a dike against the Communist menace. Finland's eastern border marks the present "western" frontier in North Europe. In the event of Soviet military aggression, it can be counted upon as a stoutly defended frontier.

But it is crystal clear that aggressive Western designs—if such were to emerge—would at once change the situation, for there appears to be not the slightest doubt that Finland (and the same applies to Sweden also) would abandon the safe anchorage of neutrality only in the event of military attack. This is a basic fact that American diplomats and strategists cannot ignore.

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*The distinguishing feature of underdeveloped areas, even more than their current poverty, is the persistence of this poverty over time. This persistent poverty implies that whatever growth in aggregate output has occurred has been matched, or more than matched, by a growth of numbers in the population. Yet if one asks why total output has not grown more rapidly than population the basic answers seem to be outside the economic sphere. In an important sense, then, the really fundamental problems of economic development are non-economic.—From the Twentieth Century Fund study, *Approaches to Economic Development*, by Norman S. Buchanan and Howard S. Ellis.*

*In a history of Rumanian foreign policy, this specialist points out that Rumanian dependence on the Soviet Union is based on "an ingenious territorial arrangement," and the hope that Moscow will someday accede to Rumania's territorial demands. "This is one of the basic factors in understanding the relations of Rumania and some other Eastern European states with the Soviet Union."*

# Rumania's Foreign Policy Evaluated

By WAYNE S. VUCINICH

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FOR A fuller understanding of Rumania's foreign relations one would almost have to retrace the historical evolution of the Rumanian people. This is necessary to appreciate the full significance of the territorial claims that are made by the Rumanian leaders and the deep-seated suspicion and hate that exist between the Rumanians and their neighbors. The Rumanians, who are descendants of Roman legions and a Thracian tribe of Dacians, virtually disappeared from the historical stage after the third century and did not re-appear until almost the thirteenth century. Their experiences during the intervening period, migrations and dispersions remain to a large degree in the realm of historical conjecture. When and how the Rumanians settled the territories they claim today—Transylvania, Bukovina, Bessarabia, Dobrudja and Banat—has not yet been established with finality.

What we do know is that in the thirteenth century, soon after the invading Mongols of

Ghenghiz Khan receded into Eurasia, there emerged two Rumanian principalities—Wallachia and Moldavia. Each had its own prince, who was assisted by *boyars* (landed aristocracy). Unlike other Latin speaking peoples, the Rumanians adhered, not to the Roman, but to the Church of Constantinople. The two principalities were involved in an almost constant struggle for survival as Hungary, Poland and the Ottoman Empire tried to reduce them to a tributary status. They in turn used these powers as checks against one another; at times the two principalities found themselves in opposite military camps.

Despite occasional successes against the Ottoman Turks, who had been gradually extending their sway over the Balkans, by the beginning of the sixteenth century Wallachia and Moldavia became Turkish vassals. In exchange for an annual tribute, they were allowed to elect their own native princes and to enjoy certain freedom in domestic affairs. The principalities, however, became embroiled in numerous Turkish wars with Poland and Hungary, and suffered material and human losses.

With the ascendancy of Russia in the time of Peter the Great at the end of the seventeenth century, the native princes began to see in Russia a liberator and a friend. The expansionist interests of Russia and the national aspirations of the Rumanians coincided; they were both directed against the Ottoman Empire. The cooperation of the princes with the Russians, who were defeated by the Turks (1711), caused the vengeful

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Sultan to substitute the rule of Phanariot princes, who purchased their thrones in Constantinople and in turn taxed the Rumanians. This system of rule lasted until 1822 when the native princes were restored and Phanariots were ousted for their disloyalty to the Sultan.

#### Growth of Russian Influence

The period of the Phanariot rule was one of frequent Russian occupations (1736–1739; 1768–1774; 1787–1792; 1806–1812) of Rumanian provinces. Before evacuating their troops the Russians usually forced the Turks to grant the Rumanians certain administrative and financial benefits. In 1774, Russia established a virtual protectorate over Rumania. Fearful of the growing Russian threat, Austria in 1775 exacted Bukovina from the Ottoman Empire, and in 1812, by the Treaty of Bucharest, the Russians obtained Bessarabia. Both Bukovina and Bessarabia were to be claimed by Rumania as her lands.

At the beginning of the Russo-Turkish war of 1828–1829, the Russians again invaded Wallachia and Moldavia, and this time remained in occupation until 1834. The Russians assisted the Rumanians in establishing a constitutional form of government and in improving social conditions. In the 1830's and 1840's, the Rumanians experienced a genuine cultural and national renaissance. They, too, became affected by the revolutionary mood then sweeping Europe. When they rebelled in 1848, the reactionary Czar and Sultan combined their forces to crush them. The Rumanians failed to achieve independence and union; and their lands were subjected to occupation by the two powers until 1851.

At the beginning of the Crimean War, 1853–1856, the Russians found it expedient to occupy the Rumanian Principalities. But the pressure of the Ottoman and Western armies compelled them to withdraw their forces, and Austria in turn sent its troops into the principalities. At the Congress of Paris that followed the war, Rumania became an international question. By the terms of the treaty of 1856, Russia lost its exclusive protection over the principalities, which were now placed under a joint Euro-

pean guarantee. Russia also had to cede a part of Bessarabia to Moldavia, being compelled thereby to withdraw from the mouths of the Danube. Europe, however, was divided as to whether the two principalities should remain independent of each other or united under Ottoman suzerainty. The commission appointed to study the problem was impaired by conflicting policies of the powers and dissension among the Rumanians themselves. The unionist cause prevailed when, in 1859, the assemblies of the two principalities elected a common prince. Austria, England and Turkey reluctantly recognized the union. France and Russia had favored it from the outset.


#### Dominance of Germany and Austria-Hungary

A brief period of rule by a native prince was followed by Prince Carol I of the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen Dynasty, who was elected to the throne of united Rumania in 1866. Austria and Russia were uneasy about a Prussian candidate in neighboring Rumania, but Germany and France accepted the new Rumanian ruler. Under a German prince Rumania drifted into Teutonic waters, although the people were mostly Francophile. In general, the period from 1866 to 1914 could be defined as one of German ascendancy over Rumania's foreign affairs. German and Austro-Hungarian economic preponderance was established, and Rumania in 1883 became a member of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy).

The Balkan insurrections of 1875 led to the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–1878. The Rumanians allowed the Russians to cross their territory and decided to participate in the war against their suzerain. The compensation that Rumania received from a victorious war, ended by the Treaty of San Stefano (March, 1878), was, however, disappointingly small. Rumania earned a right to full independence from Turkey and gained a part of Dobrudja—in exchange for the surrender of that portion of Bessarabia which was taken away from Russia in 1856. The acquisition of a part of Dobrudja served as a stimulus to Rumanian-Bulgarian national animosity which has continued since then. The powers called the Congress of Berlin to undo the treaty unilaterally arrived at be-



# THE RUMANIAN-HUNGARIAN FRONTIER 1938-1941



—Reprinted by permission of Frederick A. Praeger, Inc. (New York) from C. A. Macartney's two volume work, *A History of Hungary, 1929-1945*.

tween Russia and Turkey. But the Treaty of Berlin (June, 1878), on which Rumania depended so much, merely confirmed the existing provisions so far as Rumania was concerned.

As Rumania's nationalism mounted, the problem of *irredenta* became more acute. Rumanians claimed from Austria-Hungary the territories of Banat, Transylvania and Bukovina as their national patrimony. They claimed Bessarabia from Russia and Southern Dobrudja from Bulgaria. As a result of the Second Balkan War (1913), Rumania obtained Southern Dobrudja from vanquished Bulgaria and thereby intensified the Bulgarian-Rumanian antagonism.

### Rumania in World War I

The outbreak of World War I found Rumania wavering. At first she pursued a neutrality, and then entertained bids from both belligerent camps. The Entente powers (Great Britain, France and Russia) could offer more than the Triple Alliance powers. A victory over the Triple Alliance would give to Rumania territories far more important than the relatively backward Bessarabia, which could be acquired if she joined the Triple Alliance in a victorious war over the Entente powers. After a secret agreement, Rumania went to war against Austria-Hungary, Germany and Bulgaria, on August 27, 1916. Her armies were thoroughly routed.

The Treaty of Bucharest (May, 1918) which Germany and her allies dictated left Rumania in a state of helplessness and confusion; she was compelled to cede Southern Dobrudja which she had taken from Bulgaria in 1913. The rest of Dobrudja was placed under the joint administration of the victorious powers. Germany and Austria-Hungary also imposed upon Rumania extremely heavy financial and economic obligations. However, the German powers magnanimously compensated Rumania, promising that she might annex Bessarabia, then in a state of chaos.

A reader will recall that after the Russian revolutions of March and November, 1917, Bessarabians proclaimed their autonomy and formed a "Moldavian Democratic Republic" as part of the Federation of Socialist Republics. Fear of the Bolsheviks compelled the

Bessarabians to seek Rumania's armed support, and the "Independent Moldavian Republic" was declared in January, 1918. Rumanian forces, however, withdrew in March, 1918. A few days later, on April 8, the "Representative Council of Bessarabia" declared Bessarabia an autonomous part of Rumania. The Treaty of Bucharest authorized Rumania to annex Bessarabia, and this was accomplished under a rather questionable procedure: the "Representative Council" declared union of Bessarabia with Rumania in November, 1918.

By that time the Central Powers had begun to crumble. Bulgaria was first to drop out of the war, followed by Turkey, Austria-Hungary and Germany. With the collapse of Austria-Hungary and the withdrawal of German troops from Rumania, the latter reentered the war. As a result of the peace treaties with Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, a "Greater Rumania" emerged. She reacquired Dobrudja from Bulgaria, and received Transylvania, Bukovina and a part of the Banat.

The Paris Peace Conference did not recognize the annexation of Bessarabia by Rumania, and the subsequent promise by the great powers to do so was not carried out by some of them. Thus, the Bessarabian question remained throughout the inter-war period. The territory was beset with internal strife and economic crisis. The Soviet Union steadfastly refused to recognize Bessarabia as a part of Rumania and the relations between the two countries were in a constant state of tension.

In each of the new territories that Rumania received there were seeds of future strife. None of them was homogeneously Rumanian—though probably all had Rumanian pluralities. Rumanian historical and economic claims were no more convincing than those of her vengeful neighbors. Disputes with Yugoslavia over the division of the Banat represented the least of Rumania's territorial problems, but this too was a tension point.

### Little Entente

Because of the territorial demands of nearly all her neighbors, Rumania allied herself with the bloc in whose interest it was to maintain the territorial arrangements estab-

lished by the peace treaties. France became her major ally until the early 1930's, and Rumania ardently supported the League of Nations. In the early 1920's Rumania concluded treaties with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia to form a Little Entente; all three powers eventually signed agreements with France. Poland, who shared Rumania's fear of the Soviet Union, entered the treaty network by virtue of agreements with Rumania and France. The latter floated loans to her allies and extended them various kinds of diplomatic aid. But, as time passed, it became increasingly apparent that existing treaty arrangements were not sufficient to uphold Rumania's national security.

#### Balkan Entente

In 1934 Rumania, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia formed a Balkan Entente. Much publicity accompanied this rapprochement, and plans were made for various kinds of Balkan collaboration aimed at maintenance of the *status quo*. The alliance was directed against Bulgaria, which sought to regain the territories she once held and lost.

The Balkan Entente was born at an inauspicious moment. Hitler had come to power in Germany in 1933, and Mussolini's power seemed formidable. The prestige of Great Britain and France in Southeastern Europe had correspondingly declined. Rumania still suffered from worldwide economic depression. The economic crisis and political insecurity induced the Balkan states, including Rumania, to abandon their experimentations with democratic forms of government and to install political dictatorships. In Rumania a royal dictatorship was established in 1934 under which democratic groups suffered more than anti-Semitic and fascist elements. The Iron Guard, an indigenous fascist organization, took root and increased in strength.

The German annexation of Austria (1938) and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia (1938-1939) left Rumania in a precarious international situation. The Little Entente collapsed. The British promise (April, 1939) to defend Rumania's independence was of little significance as Germany succeeded in establishing an economic stranglehold over Rumania. The outbreak of World War II (September, 1939) and the

collapse of Poland, was a heavy blow to Rumania. The situation became even worse when the Nazis overwhelmed France in June, 1940.

Encouraged by Axis powers, Bulgaria and Hungary activated their demands for Dobrudja and Transylvania respectively. On June 26, 1940, the Soviet government formally demanded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Rumania, which turned to Germany for help. No help came from Germany, which was at the time allied with the Soviet Union (the Soviet-Nazi Pact of August, 1939), and the Rumanian government complied with Moscow's demands. By giving up Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Rumania lost 19,900 square miles of territory and about 3.5 million inhabitants.

Hungary and Bulgaria now intensified their demands upon a virtually isolated Rumania. The Axis powers backed these claims and negotiations were opened. Under the auspices of Ribbentrop and Ciano, the foreign ministers of Germany and Italy, the so-called "Vienna Award" was prepared (August 30, 1940). Accordingly, Rumania ceded to Hungary Northern Transylvania,\* an area of some 19,300 square miles and a population of 2.5 million. By the Treaty of Craiova (September 7, 1940), Rumania turned over to Bulgaria Southern Dobrudja, a loss of another 2,900 square miles with approximately 350,000 inhabitants.

The territorial losses signified the end of "Greater Rumania." King Carol II (1930-1940) was held responsible for the national tragedy and demonstrations demanding his abdication broke out. In September, 1940, accompanied by his mistress, Mme. Lupescu, the King went into exile, and in 1953 he died in Portugal. General Ion Antonescu proclaimed himself the "Conducator" (Leader) and proceeded to rule the country with an iron fist. In October, he invited Germany to send troops to Rumania. For this and other forms of cooperation, the Germans shifted their support from the Iron Guard, which had tried to seize power in 1941, to a complete reliance on Antonescu.

When the Germans invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Rumanian troops

\* Including part of the Crisana and the province of Maramures.

cooperated with them. Most Rumanians welcomed the war because it led to the speedy recovery of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. But as the Rumanian troops advanced beyond Bessarabia, many Rumanians began to oppose the continuance of war. The territory beyond the Dniester—outside the Rumanian ethnic orbit—was organized into "Transnistria," and was eventually annexed to Rumania.

The Soviet counter-offensive, which began at Stalingrad in the winter of 1943, gained momentum and soon led to the encirclement and annihilation of many thousands of Rumanian and German troops. From now on there was a growing certainty in Rumania that national disaster was imminent. In the mid-1943's the first contacts were established, through neutral capitals, between certain Rumanian representatives and the Western powers. But the Western powers—even had they so desired—would not have been in a position to save Rumania, considering the inevitable occupation of Rumania by Soviet troops.

In their negotiations with the Western plenipotentiaries, the Rumanian negotiators assured the West of their people's friendship and their desire to regain for their country only the lands lost in 1940. The democratic opposition, led by Iuliu Maniu (National Peasant party) and Constantin Bratianu (National Liberal party), urged peace even after heavy American bombardment of Ploesti oilfields (August, 1943). In March, 1944, at Cairo, the Rumanian spokesman was told that there would be no separate agreements with the Western powers, and that the Soviet Union would insist on retaining Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. This was confirmed by the Soviet representative who also added that Rumania would be given Northern Transylvania, if she cooperated in the war against Germany. These conditions were reiterated by Molotov on April 13, 1944. In the meantime, the British and American aircraft continued air raids over Ploesti and Bucharest.

Under the pressure of mounting domestic opposition, and military reversals, King Michael, on August 23, 1944, asked General Antonescu to resign, and announced his acceptance of the Allied surrender terms. The formation of a new government was en-

trusted then to General Constantin Sanatescu.

### Satellite Status

The armistice was signed on September 12, 1944. The country was occupied by Soviet forces; Antonescu was arrested; and the Allied Control Council (A.C.C.) was established. In October, 1944, Eden and Molotov agreed that Rumania should become an exclusive Soviet sphere of influence. By virtue of this agreement, Rumania was doomed to become a Soviet satellite. The Western representatives in the A.C.C. were effectively by-passed and denied any voice in Rumanian affairs. Protests against the persecution of the democratic opposition were virtually ignored by Soviet representatives in Rumania and the government in Moscow. In October, 1944, a group of Leftist parties and trade unions organized the National Democratic Front (N.D.F.). Sanatescu's government was compelled to resign in December, 1944, after it apparently no longer served Soviet aims.

A new government was formed by General Nicolae Radescu, who in short order also incurred Communist wrath. Attacks on the government by the N.D.F. culminated in demonstrations and violence on February 24, 1945. This brought Andrei Vyshinsky, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, to Bucharest and on his orders the King asked Radescu to resign. On March 6, Petru Groza, an ally of the Communists and the head of the Ploughmen's Front, was named the new Prime Minister. He and his organization fully cooperated with the Communists; the new cabinet did not include representatives from either the National Peasant or National Liberal parties—the two largest political parties in the country. This change reduced Rumania to a full-fledged Soviet satellite. When the United States protested against the Soviet unilateral interference in Rumania's internal affairs as being a violation of the Yalta agreement, the Soviet Union countered with reference to British action in Greece.

At the Potsdam Conference (July-August, 1945) the United States and Great Britain expressed dissatisfaction with the political situation in Rumania and announced that they would not recognize Groza's government. The importance of the stand taken



by the democratic powers was overestimated by Rumanian democratic groups and the King. Encouraged by developments at Potsdam, the King asked Groza to resign, but the Premier, with Soviet backing, ignored the royal order.

At the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow (December, 1945) a compromise was reached. The Soviet government agreed to prevail upon the Rumanians to broaden their government by including two members of democratic parties. Two second-rate members of the Peasant and Liberal parties were admitted into the government, but this in no way furthered the cause of democracy in Rumania. On the contrary, it gave a stamp of approval to the Communist regime. In February, 1946, the Western powers recognized the Groza government, thereby legalizing the Communist regime.

The next controversy concerned the election. The Communist electoral law assured the Communists—through the N.D.F.—of an overwhelming victory in the election of November 19, 1946. Protests against irregularities, intimidation and undemocratic practices were ignored. Shortly after the election, the Treaty of Peace with Rumania (February, 1947) was announced. The Western powers included in the document a provision by which Rumania guaranteed its citizens fundamental rights and freedoms. The Treaty sanctioned the territorial changes that had been already made and imposed upon Rumania certain military and economic obligations.

The major foreign problems having been resolved, the government now consolidated its powers and proceeded to crush its class enemies. By the end of the year it had forced King Michael's abdication (December 30) and had given the country a constitution confirming the existing order. On April 13, Rumania was formally proclaimed a republic. The war against the enemies of communism continued; Maniu and his friends were tried and jailed.

The foreign policy of Communist Rumania is indistinguishable from that of the Soviet Union. The Rumanian government has supported the Soviet line on all international issues. A few problems, however, concern Rumania more directly than the Soviet Union. After the expulsion of Yugo-

slavia from the Cominform, in June, 1948, Rumania was given the assignment of intimidating and pressuring Yugoslavia. A policy of persecution against the Yugoslav minority was initiated, and anti-Tito organizations were founded. Thousands of Yugoslavs, primarily Serbs, were put into internment camps. The Yugoslav ships on the Danube were fired upon by Rumanian guns. Rumania refused to cooperate on the Danube navigation clearance in the Iron Gate, and, like other Communist states, imposed an economic blockade on Yugoslavia. This situation continued until Stalin's death in 1953. Since then the Rumanian-Yugoslav tension has subsided and economic and political relations are somewhat more normal. A Danube agreement has been concluded. However, with the deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, following the Hungarian Revolution of October, 1956, relations between Rumania and Yugoslavia have likewise worsened.

#### Anti-Semitism

With Soviet insistence and as a result of East-West bargaining, Rumania was finally admitted to the United Nations (December, 1955). This satisfied the ego of the Rumanian people and its Communist leaders, but otherwise has had little effect on Rumania's foreign relations. Anti-Semitism is still manifest. After World War II, the number of Jews in the country was estimated at 250,000. In recent years the Rumanian government has pursued an anti-Zionist policy, because Zionism—in the language of official spokesmen—represents a form of bourgeois nationalism, and is a "tool" of imperialism. Zionists have endured arrests and trials; thousands of Jews have been allowed to emigrate to Israel. The stream of Jewish emigrants from Rumania is estimated, in January, 1959, at 6,000 a month, and was expected to reach 10,000 a month by March. Israeli Premier Ben-Gurion observed that the Rumanian policy was "not a matter of caprice, but stems from a decision of the country's regime to get rid of Jews."

#### U. S.-Rumanian Relations

Relations with the United States have been strained over a long period. Rumanians insulted American officials with espionage

and intrigues. Since April, 1949, the United States and Great Britain have repeatedly protested against Rumanian violations of clauses pertaining to human rights and other provisions of the peace treaty. Great Britain has also protested and the United Nations passed resolutions condemning Rumania. In 1950, the United States Information Office and all American consulates in Bucharest were closed, and the United States diplomatic corps was reduced to six persons. For a time, diplomatic relations between the two countries were suspended, and in 1952, American travel to Rumania was prohibited. American retaliatory action restricted the travel of Rumanian diplomats in the United States because of similar restrictions imposed on American diplomats in Rumania. In 1953, the United States banned the distribution of certain Rumanian publications in the United States—again as a retaliatory measure.

On March 12, 1956, the United States government seized \$13 million in Rumanian gold, frozen in the United States since World War II, pending the settlement of the United States claim of \$88.5 million for war damages and the nationalization of American property in the Ploesti oilfield. Although travel to Rumania was re-opened in October, 1955, and the United States has restored diplomatic relations with Rumania, suspended in 1951, the relations between the two countries are anything but friendly.

As for Rumania's foreign relations with the countries of Southeast Asia and the Middle East, they are consistent with those of the Soviet Union. Trade and cultural relations with these countries have been expanded and exchanges of official visits made. The same is true of relations with China, with which a cultural and trade exchange has been established. Relations with Western powers have materially improved since Stalin's death in 1953. The state of war with Western Germany ended in 1955.

#### **Relations Within Communist Orbit**

There is, of course, nothing startling or novel about Rumania's relations with other Communist countries. Rumania was a member of the Cominform—the Communist Information Bureau (1947)—until its dissolution in April, 1956. She belongs to the

Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (1949), and her economy is co-ordinated with Soviet economic planning. Despite some trade increases with Western powers, about four-fifths of her foreign trade is still with the Communist countries, primarily with the U.S.S.R.

Rumania is also a member of the Warsaw Pact—a treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance (1955)—which authorizes the Soviet Union to retain its forces in Rumania “until the foreign troops withdraw from Western Europe.” Here it should be noted that the peace treaty of 1947 permitted the Soviet Union to maintain line-of-communication troops in Rumania until a treaty with Austria became effective. Such a treaty was concluded in 1955, but Soviet Russia regained her military privilege in Rumania through the Warsaw Pact.

Rumania's armed forces may not be reliable from the Soviet standpoint, but the strategic location of Rumania, its oil resources, and air and naval bases are of considerable military importance to the Soviet Union. Rumania has a series of bilateral agreements and arrangements with other Communist countries, which provide for their mutual economic, political and cultural cooperation. The coordination of scientific and scholarly work with Soviet centers of learning is an important aspect of intra-Communist relations.

There is little respect as such for the Soviet Union in Rumania. The Rumanian distrust of Russians is deep-seated. Rumania's claims to Bessarabia and North Bukovina have not been forgotten. Rumanians have not yet learned to like Bulgaria and are still sensitive about the loss of Southern Dobrudja. It will take a long time before Rumanians and Hungarians abandon their rivalry over Transylvania.

The Soviet Union maintains Rumanian dependence by an ingenious territorial arrangement. In order to keep Transylvania, Rumania must of necessity depend on the Soviet Union's support. If Rumania loses Soviet affection, it may not benefit from possible border rectifications at the expense of the Soviet Union or Bulgaria (Dobrudja) or possibly Yugoslavia (Banat). No other power is able or willing to support any of these Rumanian territorial claims. This is

one of the basic factors in understanding the relations of Rumania and some other Eastern European states with the Soviet Union.

The question is this: Can Western powers satisfy the national aspirations of Eastern European states and provide them national security? The experience at Munich is still vivid in the minds of many Eastern Europeans. Vivid in their minds also are the World War II conferences at which Western powers, in order to attain "higher objectives," seemed willing to bargain away the independence and security of Eastern European states.

#### United States Policy

What should American policy be regarding Rumania? Clearly, after the Hungarian tragedy there should be less talk of liberation. The United States is still suffering from the loss of prestige it suffered on that occasion. Yet it would be a mistake if the Rumanians were allowed to lose confidence in themselves and lose hope for the future. They should become aware of the meaning of democracy. This must be done with caution when praising Rumania's past because her governments were a far cry from democracy. Nor should there be constant allusions to the "American way of life." The worst American propaganda is gloating over American superiority. This more than anything injures the sensitivities of those not so well off and serves to confirm Communist accusations that Americans are arrogant, egocentric and conceited in their relations with other peoples. Rumanians should be convinced of the necessity of building their own democracy in accordance with their own conditions and traditions. Much of this could be accomplished by exposing the failures and shortcomings of the Communist regime. To do this effectively, propaganda must be based on incontrovertible facts and entrusted to people who are respected in Rumania.

#### Cultural Exchange

Above all else, the United States must take the initiative. It must promote cultural exchange of various kinds. Although this may seem unrealistic, the United States might offer financial grants or aid to Ru-

mania for social and cultural projects. These might be carried out with or without official United States supervision. Books and periodicals could be given to Rumanian centers of learning; students and professors could be exchanged with Rumania; offers could be made of cooperation in various fields of science. Tourism should be encouraged and commercial intercourse between the two countries expanded. Even modest cultural and economic intercourse between Rumania and the United States is likely to encourage freedom and democracy.

There surely must be some effective way of exposing Communist distortions and mistaken interpretations of historical events. Moscow has inundated Rumania and the other satellites, as well as the less developed countries, with histories of their peoples. These studies, Marxian in frame of reference, often elaborately conceived and richly illustrated, have been made readily available and inexpensive. The Soviet propagandists, and correctly, consider this body of literature an important media for ideological war against the Western democracies, a war which has been waged on the level of ancient as well as modern history, not to mention the sciences and humanities.

Herein lies a great opportunity for private American institutions and the United States government: to create a program of research and publication with the purpose of producing definitive and objective histories and studies of countries which are captives of communism or lacking in resources to produce histories of their own peoples. Such works would have far-reaching repercussions, and should be written in the Rumanian as well as the English languages. There is a danger that Communist historical distortions, left unchallenged, may ultimately be accepted as fact. Under existing conditions Rumanian scholars are not in a position to write the truth; that task, therefore, must be done by those who are.

The time has come for a re-evaluation of American policy toward Soviet captive-nations, and for the creation of a well-formulated ideological alternative to Communist doctrine, together with an effective technique for assuring its acceptance.

## Received At Our Desk

**SINKIANG: Pawn or Pivot?** By ALLEN S. WHITING AND GENERAL SHENG SHIH-TS'AI. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958. 314 pages, appendix, bibliography and index, \$5.00.)

Should Sino-Soviet difficulties develop in the next decade and become matters of open discord, they will very likely involve, in part, the strategically important, underdeveloped, sparsely-settled and little-known province of Sinkiang. Bordered by the U.S.S.R. on the north and west, by Mongolia on the northeast, by Tibet on the south, and by China on the east, Sinkiang is an unexplored region of great potential mineral wealth and political significance.

Two men of different cultures and professions have added immeasurably to our knowledge of Sinkiang. Perhaps most importantly, as a case study of Soviet penetration—economic, political and military—this excellent study illumines an area of vast ignorance.

Dr. Whiting, an American political scientist specializing in Sino-Soviet affairs, has achieved prominence for his original contributions in this field; General Sheng Shih-ts'ai was the military governor and ruler in Sinkiang from 1933 to 1944. He brings to this study his own interpretation of the complex events of his rule in Sinkiang.

The book consists of two parts. "The first is a chronological account and analysis of Soviet strategy from 1933 to 1949, presenting Sinkiang as a model case study with reference to borderlands adjoining the Soviet Union." By examining Moscow's policies, and those of the key groups involved, "parallel patterns are suggested elsewhere when similar situations emerge." Sheng Shih-ts'ai's memoirs make up the second part of the book.

No brief review can do justice to the themes treated by the authors, nor present a suitable digest of their analyses. But

this reviewer can strongly urge any student of Soviet foreign policy to read the book. It deserves attention and acclaim.

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**THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV CONTROVERSY, 1948-1958: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD.** EDITED BY ROBERT BASS AND ELIZABETH MARBURY. Introduction by Hans Kohn. (New York: Prospect Books for the East Europe Institute, 1959. 225 pages, \$3.95.)

This documentary history of the last decade of Soviet-Yugoslav relations traces the cardinal divergences between these two Communist countries. The break from orthodox Stalinist communism and the evolution of Yugoslavia's particular brand, i.e., "national Communism," became inevitable when the C.P.Y. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia) had to choose between allegiance to Moscow and loyalty to the nation.

This sticking point which has caused the Kremlin so much anxiety (first with Yugoslavia, later Poland and Hungary) is further clarified in the introduction by Mr. Kohn who states that "the twentieth century is . . . becoming the age of pan-nationalism." ". . . The relationship between Communism and nationalism in the twentieth century represents a fundamental contradiction between Communist theory and practice, which no dialectic juggling with definitions, nor even diplomatic niceties, can solve. The Soviet-Yugoslav dispute offers a perfect illustration of this contradiction. . . . Today as ten years ago, what separates the Yugoslav Communists from most of their fellow-Communists is not so much doctrinal differences as nationalist considerations."

The authors have chosen an interesting collection of documents, to be commended also for their readability, which well illus-



trate the problem that the Soviet Union faces with its satellites. Either, as in the case of Tito, the C.P.S.U. has completely dissociated itself, or, as in the case of East Europe, armed force has been the last resort. Moscow has yet to find a workable answer to maintaining a balance between nationalist independence and submission to Soviet communism.

**TITOISM IN ACTION.** BY FRED WARNER NEAL. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958. Illustrated. 331 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$6.50.)

Subtitled "the reforms in Yugoslavia after 1948," this book attempts to clarify Yugoslavia's anomalous position as a socialist state which has remained independent of Moscow and the Communist bloc. The author's thesis is that Yugoslav socialism is essentially undogmatic and pragmatic; it will not follow an ideology that is blind to the immediacy of Yugoslavia's needs.

This "nationalist deviation" led, in 1948, to the expulsion of the Yugoslav Communist party from the Cominform. President Tito, who had either to sink or swim, devised a new socio-political-economic system. The new system differed from Moscow policy; however, the Yugoslavs declared, their reforms were based on Marxian ideals and met the particular needs of Yugoslav society.

The reforms themselves are an interesting illustration of the Yugoslav willingness to balance its "contradictions," "seemingly inherent in the new reforms. For example, these reforms create a decentralized economy, in which initiative has full play within the confines of economic laws, and at the same time maintain a socialist and a planned economy. . . . On the political side, the reforms have had the effect of making for more personal freedom and encouraging discussion of new ideas while the Communist party continues to exercise exclusive control. Further, these developments are taking place in a country comprised of a people with a low cultural level, widespread illiteracy, and no real experience in self-government—a people who are inevitably confused by the ideological zigzagging of the past decade."

Despite its rough spots, Titoism in action presents "a devastating Marxist criticism of Soviet theory and practice, and opens new theoretical and operational horizons for Marxism." The Yugoslav movement has proven that "national Marxist socialism unrelated to any organized world movement" and independent of the U.S.S.R. can function. Small wonder then that the Communist campaign against Yugoslavia raged so heatedly.

**FROM BISMARCK TO ADENAUER:** Aspects of German Statecraft. BY GORDON A. CRAIG. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. 155 pages and index with introduction, \$4.50.)

This volume represents "The Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History" for 1958 at Johns Hopkins University, and traces the history of modern German diplomacy, its successes and failures. The author has translated German foreign policy in terms of the personalities who formulated it. The result is not a diplomatic history but, more fascinating, an analysis (and semi-psychoanalysis) of the German Chancellors from Bismarck to Adenauer. The passages dealing with Bismarck's politics are superior; this Machiavellian statesman is given fair and objective treatment. According to Gordon Craig, Bismarck fulfilled Max Weber's three essentials for a successful statesman: "passion [i.e. "total commitment"], a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion."

The "Wilhelmine statesmen"—Holstein, Bülow, and Kiderlen-Wächter—were Bismarck's successors and lacked the master's talents. Rathenau and Stresemann's accomplishments are rated as "the art of the possible," "a diplomatic art" that "makes a virtue of necessity." Bruening's hurry and lack of "reflection" made him a poor diplomat by the author's standards.

Although documentary material for a complete assessment of Konrad Adenauer is not available, the author gives a "tentative appraisal" of Adenauer as a man unaffected by "that corrosive nationalism that has in the past distorted the German spirit."

# WALL MAPS of CENTRAL EUROPE WENSCHOW RELIEF-LIKE GERMAN-TEXT

Map. No.	Area	Mi. to In.	Size
<b>RL38bw</b>	BADEN-WURTTENBERG .....	2.3	74 x 92"
<b>RL71</b>	BAVARIA .....	3.1	86 x 84"
<b>RL28g</b>	CENTRAL EUROPE .....	16	86 x 70"
<b>RL28rp</b>	CENTRAL EUROPE .....	12	78 x 76"
<b>RL28c</b>	CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE .....	16	66 x 92"
<b>RL38ce</b>	CENTRAL & EAST GERMANY .....	5.5	98 x 68"
<b>RL2g</b>	EUROPE .....	47	82 x 68"
<b>RL38g</b>	GERMANY .....	9	98 x 70"
<b>RL28h</b>	HESSE .....	3.1	44 x 64"
<b>RL28ls</b>	LOWER SAXONY .....	3.9	57 x 54"
<b>RL38mf</b>	MITTLEFRANKEN .....	1.6	72 x 66"
<b>RL38lb</b>	NIEDERBAYERN .....	1.6	72 x 66"
<b>RL35rp</b>	NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA .....	3.1	60 x 71"
<b>RL38nw</b>	NORTHWEST GERMANY .....	4	96 x 92"
<b>RL38ub</b>	OBERBAYERN .....	1.6	72 x 68"
<b>RL38up</b>	OBERPFALZ .....	1.6	54 x 72"
<b>RL35rpl</b>	RHINE-WESTPHALIA (INDUST. AREA) .....	1.2	98 x 72"
<b>RL38rps</b>	RHINELAND-PFALZ AND SAARLAND .....	4	40 x 50"
<b>RL38s</b>	SAARLAND .....	0.8	64 x 57"
<b>RL28sh</b>	SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN .....	1.5	85 x 79"
<b>RL38sw</b>	SCHWABEN .....	1.6	64 x 54"
<b>RL39g</b>	SOUTH GERMANY .....	3.1	93 x 67"
<b>RL38sb</b>	SUDBAYERN .....	3.1	64 x 54"
<b>RL38lf</b>	UNTERFRANKEN .....	1.6	76 x 60"
<b>RL2wg</b>	WESTERN EUROPE .....	16	68 x 90"

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# Current Documents

## Alaska: The Forty-ninth State

On January 3, 1959, President Eisenhower issued a proclamation admitting the state of Alaska into the Union and an Executive Order on the new official American flag. The complete texts of these documents follow:

### ADMISSION OF THE STATE OF ALASKA INTO THE UNION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

#### A Proclamation

Whereas the Congress of the United States by the act approved on July 7, 1958 (72 Stat. 339), accepted, ratified, and confirmed the Constitution adopted by a vote of the people of Alaska in an election held on April 24, 1956, and provided for the admission of the State of Alaska into the Union on an equal footing with the other states of the Union upon compliance with certain procedural requirements specified in that act; and

Whereas it appears from information before me that a majority of the legal votes cast at an election held on August 26, 1958, were in favor of each of the propositions required to be submitted to the people of Alaska by Section 8 (B) of the Act of July 7, 1958; and

Whereas it further appears from information before me that a general election was held on November 25, 1958, and that the returns of the general election were made and certified as provided in the Act of July 7, 1958; and

Whereas the acting Governor of Alaska has certified to me the results of the submission to the people of Alaska of the three propositions set forth in Section 8 (B) of the Act of July 7, 1958, and the results of the general election; and

Whereas I find and announce that the people of Alaska have duly adopted the propositions required to be submitted to them by the Act of July 7, 1958, and have duly elected the officers required to be elected by that act:

Now, therefore, I, Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim that the procedural requirements imposed by the Congress on the State of Alaska to entitle that state to admission into the Union have been complied with

in all respects and that admission of the State of Alaska into the Union on an equal footing with the other states of the Union is now accomplished.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington at one minute past noon on this third day of January in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-nine, and of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-third.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

By The President:

Christian A. Herter, Acting Secretary of State.

#### Executive Order

### FLAG OF THE UNITED STATES

Whereas the State of Alaska has this day been admitted to the Union; and

Whereas Chapter 1 of Title 4 of the United States Code provides that a star shall be added to the union of the flag of the United States upon the admission of a new state into the Union and provides that that addition to the flag shall take effect on the Fourth day of July then next succeeding the admission of that state; and

Whereas the interests of the Government require that orderly and reasonable provision be made for certain features of the flag:

Now, therefore, under and by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as commander in chief of the armed forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Proportions. National flags and union jacks for all departments and other agencies of the Executive branch of the Government (hereinafter referred to as Executive agencies) shall conform to the following proportions:

Hoist (width) of flag—1

Fly (length) of flag—1.9

Hoist (width) of union—0.5385 (7/13)

Fly (length) of union—0.76

Width of each stripe—0.0769 (1/13)

Such further proportions as are set forth on the attachment hereto. That attachment is hereby made a part of this order.

Section 2. Sizes. (A) Flags manufactured or purchased for Executive agencies shall be limited to those having hoists as follows:

(1) 20 feet, (2) 19 feet, (3) 14.35 feet, (4) 12.19 feet, (5) 10 feet, (6) 8.94 feet, (7) 5.14 feet, (8) 5 feet, (9) 3.52 feet, (10) 2.90 feet, (11) 2.37 feet, (12) 1.31 feet.

(B) Union jacks manufactured or purchased for Executive agencies shall be limited to those the hoists of which correspond to the hoists of the unions of flags of sizes herein authorized. The size of the union jack flown with the national flag shall be the same as the size of the union of that national flag.

Section 3. Position of stars. The position of each star of the union of the flag, and of the union jack, shall be as indicated on the attachment hereto.

Section 4. Public inquiries. Interested persons may direct inquiries concerning this order to the Quartermaster General of the Army. Inquiries relating to the procurement of national flags by executive agencies other than the Department of Defense may be

directed to the General Services Administration.

Section 5. Applicability; prior flag and jack. (A) All national flags and union jacks manufactured or purchased for the use of Executive agencies after the date of this order shall conform strictly to the provisions of Sections 1 to 3, inclusive, of this order.

(B) The colors carried by troops, and camp colors, shall be of the sizes prescribed by the Secretary of Defense for the Armed Forces of the United States and the sizes of those colors shall not be subject to the provisions of this order.

(C) Subject to such limited exceptions as the Secretary of Defense, in respect of the Department of Defense, and the administrator of General Services, in respect of Executive agencies other than the Department of Defense, may approve, all national flags and union jacks now in the possession of Executive agencies, or hereafter acquired, under contracts awarded prior to the date of this order, by Executive agencies, including those so possessed or so acquired by the General Services Administration for distribution to other executive agencies, shall be utilized until unserviceable.

Section 6. The flag prescribed by this order shall become the official flag under Chapter 1 of Title 4 of the United States Code as of July 4, 1959.

Section 7. Revocation. Executive Order No. 2390 of May 29, 1916, is hereby revoked.

Section 8. This order shall be published in the Federal Register.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
The White House,  
January 3, 1959.

### Russia Announces the Lunar Rocket Launching

On January 2, the U.S.S.R. launched a rocket in the direction of the moon and almost immediately claimed success in a public statement. Statements were made on January 3 describing the rocket's flight and orbit around the sun. The three complete texts follow:

#### The Rocket's Launching

Nineteen fifty-seven-fifty-eight were marked by outstanding achievements of the U.S.S.R. in the construction of rockets. The experience of Soviet artificial earth satellites has made it possible to accumulate the material

necessary for an implementation of space flights and for reaching other planets of the solar system. Scientific research and experimental designing carried out in the U.S.S.R. were aimed at creating large and heavy artificial earth satellites. As is well known,



Soviet satellite three weighed 1,327 kilograms (2,919.4 pounds).

When, on October 4, 1957, the world's first artificial satellite was successfully launched and other satellites were successfully launched afterward in accordance with the International Geophysical Year program, a cosmic speed of eight kilometers (about five miles) per second was obtained for the first time.

As a result of further creative work on the part of Soviet scientists, designers, engineers and workers, a multistage rocket, the last stage of which can reach a second cosmic speed of 11.2 kilometers (about seven miles) per second, making interplanetary flights possible, has now been created.

On January 2, 1959, a cosmic rocket was launched toward the moon in the U.S.S.R.

The multistage cosmic rocket has come out according to program on the trajectory of its movement in the direction of the moon.

According to preliminary data, the last stage of the rocket received the requisite second cosmic speed.

Continuing its progress, the rocket has crossed the eastern border of the Soviet Union, passed over the Hawaiian Islands, and it continues to move over the Pacific Ocean, rapidly moving away from the earth.

At 0310 Moscow time, on January 3 [7:10 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, January 2] the cosmic rocket, moving toward the moon, will pass over the southern part of Sumatra, being at a distance of about 110,000 kilometers (about 68,750 miles) from the earth.

According to preliminary calculations which are being made more precise by direct observation, the cosmic rocket will reach the area of the moon at approximately 0700 (Moscow time) on January 4, 1959 [11 P.M., January 3].

The last stage of the cosmic rocket weighing 1,472 kilograms (3,245.2 pounds) without fuel, is equipped with a special container inside which are placed the measuring instruments for carrying out the following scientific observations: the ascertaining of the magnetic field of the moon; the study of the intensity and the variations of intensity of cosmic rays outside the magnetic field of the earth; the registration of photons in cosmic radiation; the discovery of the radio-activity

of the moon; the study of the distribution of heavy nuclei in cosmic radiation; the study of the gas components of interplanetary matter; the study of corpuscular solar radiation; and the study of meteoric particles.

For observation of the flight of the last stage of the cosmic rocket there have been installed in it a radio transmitter emitting on two frequencies—19.997 and 19.995 megacycles—telegraphic messages of a duration of .8 and 1.6 seconds;

A radio transmitter working on a frequency of 19.993 megacycles emitting telegraphic messages of a variable duration of 50.9 seconds by means of which the data of scientific observations are being emitted;

A radio transmitter working on a frequency of 183.6 megacycles is being used for measuring the co-ordinates of the movement and the transmission to earth of scientific information;

Special instruments designed to create a sodium cloud of an artificial comet.

The artificial comet may be observed and photographed by optical means equipped with light filters eliminating the spectral line of sodium.

The artificial comet will be formed on January 3 at about 0357 (Moscow time) [7:57 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, January 2] and it will be visible for about two to five minutes in the constellation of Virgo, approximately in the center of a triangle formed by the stars Alpha Bootes, Alpha Virgo and Alpha Libra.

The cosmic rocket is carrying pennants with the coat of arms of the U.S.S.R. and the inscription "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January, 1959."

The total weight of scientific and measuring instruments together with sources of current supply and the container is 361.3 kilograms (796.5 pounds).

Scientific measuring stations located in various parts of the U.S.S.R. are conducting observations of the first interplanetary flight.

The determination of the elements of the trajectory is being effected on electronic computers according to measurement data which are being automatically received at a co-ordinating and computing center.

The processing of the results will make it possible to obtain data about the movement of the cosmic rocket and to determine the

areas of the interplanetary space in which scientific observations are being carried out.

The creative toil of the whole Soviet people aimed at the solution of the most important problems of the development of Socialist society in the interests of all progressive mankind has made it possible to carry out the first successful interplanetary flight.

The launching of the Soviet cosmic rocket once more shows the high level of the development of Soviet rocket construction and again demonstrates to the world the outstanding achievements of leading Soviet science and technology.

The deepest mysteries of the world are becoming more accessible to man, who, in the near future, will be able to step onto the surface of other planets himself.

The workers of scientific-research institutes, designing bureaus, plants and testing organizations who have created the new rocket for interplanetary communications dedicate this launching to the Twenty-first C.P.S.U. (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) Congress.

Broadcasts of data on the flight of the space rocket will be made regularly by all radio stations of the U.S.S.R.

### The Rocket's Flight

It is now fully clear that the Soviet moon rocket will become a satellite of the sun, the first artificial planet, stated Alexander Topchiev, vice president of the United Soviet Socialist Republics' Academy of Sciences, in an interview given to Tass tonight.

The velocity and direction of the flight made it possible to say with confidence that the space ship will never again fall back on the earth.

According to data of Soviet tracking stations, by 2100 hours Moscow time [1 P.M. New York time] the moon rocket had reached an altitude of 284,000 kilometers [76,540 miles], moving at a speed of approximately 9,000 kilometers [5,589 miles] an hour.

Thus it has covered almost 80 per cent of the distance separating the moon from the earth.

### The Solar Orbit

The maximum diameter of the orbit of the first artificial satellite of the sun, which is what the Soviet moon rocket will become, will be 343,600,000 kilometers [214,750,000 miles] and the time of its revolution around the sun will be fifteen months.

According to preliminary calculations of the coordination and computation center, the new planet's orbit will be close to a circle, with an eccentricity of 0.148.

The major axis of the orbit will be at an angle of 15 degrees to the major axis of the earth. The plane of the rocket's orbit will practically coincide with the plane of the earth's orbit.

The Soviet artificial planet will reach the point nearest to the sun—the perihelion—on January 14, 1959, when it will be at a distance of about 146,400,000 kilometers [91,500,000 miles] from it.

The maximum distance from the sun will be 197,200,000 kilometers [123,250,000 miles].

The artificial planet will reach this point at the beginning of September, 1959.

Measurements of the trajectory of the Soviet cosmic rocket are being carried out with the aid of radio-technical systems which have permitted the obtaining of exact data on parameters of its movement and have permitted the making of long-term forecasts, in particular, the determination of the future orbit of the artificial planet.

The coordination and computation center is continuing to process and has permitted the making of long-term forecasts, in particular, the determination of the future orbit of the artificial planet.

The coordination and computation center is continuing to process and has permitted material relating to the trajectory measurements and all parameters of the rocket's movement are being established exactly.

*Uranium has been used for years as a colorant in ceramics and glass, but not until World War II did man learn how to control the reactions in order to derive a net output of energy from the atom.—From a Twentieth Century Fund survey.*

## The Month in Review

### INTERNATIONAL

#### Berlin Crisis, The

Feb. 3—U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles leaves to confer with Western leaders in London, Paris and Bonn on the Russian proposal of November, 1958, to make Berlin a free, demilitarized city, and on the general question of Germany's status.

Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev tells the West German Ambassador to Moscow that he is not opposed to unifying Germany on the basis of free elections provided that the two Germanies arrange these elections themselves without "pressure by foreign powers."

Feb. 4—Dulles meets with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to discuss the German question in view of Macmillan's imminent trip to the Soviet Union.

Four U.S. trucks, detained by the Russians for 54 hours, are allowed to continue their journey to Berlin, following a strong U.S. protest to authorities in Moscow.

Feb. 6—Dulles and French President Charles de Gaulle discuss Western policy on Berlin and Germany.

Feb. 7—West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and Dulles discuss the Soviet proposals for ending Allied occupation of West Berlin and for a German peace treaty.

Feb. 8—Dulles and Adenauer agree that Western negotiation with the Soviet Union should yield "no concessions without counter-concessions" by the Kremlin.

West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt arrives in Washington on a visit.

Feb. 9—Dulles returns to the U.S. and declares that the Western powers agree to resist if necessary to maintain their "position in, and access to, West Berlin."

Feb. 10—"Diplomatic informants" in Washington reveal that in talks with Western leaders last week, Dulles secured a general agreement on "negotiating principles." It

is also believed that the British agreed to the use of force if necessary to maintain passage rights to West Berlin.

Feb. 12—"East German sources" discuss a possible solution to the Berlin dilemma: a Soviet guarantee to use its good offices to settle possible disputes between the West and East Germany over the right of transit to West Berlin.

Feb. 13—The U.S. State Department announces that "if developments warrant," British, French, West German and U.S. foreign ministers will meet in mid-March.

Feb. 16—The three Western powers invite the Soviet Union to a Big Four foreign ministers' meeting to which German advisers will be admitted. In answer to the Soviet proposal for a 28-nation meeting to draft a German peace treaty, the Allies claim that responsibility for Germany lies with the major nations who fought against her during World War II.

Feb. 17—Soviet Premier Khrushchev warns the West that the Communist bloc is prepared to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. In a speech at Tula, an industrial city 105 miles from Moscow, he says that East Germany would consequently obtain sovereign status and that "Therefore no encroachment on the territory of the German Democratic Republic . . . either by ground, air or water can be allowed."

Feb. 18—President Eisenhower says that the West will use force to enter Berlin only if the Communists use force first to keep the Allies out.

Feb. 21—British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan arrives in Moscow for talks with Soviet Premier Khrushchev. Macmillan urges the two countries to avoid "misunderstanding" and to work "on things that unite us."

Feb. 22—Khrushchev and Macmillan spend 8 hours in discussion.

It is reported that the Allies now be-

lieve that Russia will turn control of access to West Berlin over to East Germany by the May 27 deadline whether talks are under way or not.

Feb. 24—Khrushchev tells Soviet voters—while Macmillan and the British delegation visit an atomic center out of Moscow—that the West must recognize the two German states and “sign a peace treaty with both.” He rejects the West’s suggestion for a foreign ministers’ conference and urges a heads-of-state meeting to discuss East-West problems. He also proposes that Britain and the U.S.S.R. sign a treaty of non-aggression.

The U.S. says it cannot accept the Soviet Premier’s speech as his official answer to a foreign ministers’ conference.

Feb. 26—In their last meeting, Khrushchev and Macmillan repeat their views on Berlin, in a very cool atmosphere.

#### Conference on Nuclear Test Ban

Feb. 2—The U.S. and Britain refuse to consider a Russian suggestion that the Big Three maintain the possibility of veto in the 7-nation control commission to police a nuclear weapons test ban.

Feb. 3—The U.S. says that Soviet insistence on broad veto powers will make the weapons test ban conference “a sham-ble.”

Feb. 7—The U.S.S.R. challenges the U.S. insistence on majority vote in the 7-member control commission as “veiled veto power.”

Feb. 11—The U.S.S.R. suggests that in the 7-nation control commission, two of the 4 rotating seats should be assigned to states “friendly to the Soviet Union,” one to a Western nation and one to a neutral, to balance the 2 to 1 advantage among the permanent members—the U.S. and Britain vs. the U.S.S.R.

Feb. 16—Chief U.S. delegate James J. Wadsworth says that no limits can be placed on on-site inspection of the nuclear test monitor teams.

#### The United Nations

Feb. 17—The U.N. Trusteeship Council suggests in a resolution passed 12 to 1, that the U.N. trusteeship over the French Cameroon should end January 1, 1960.

Feb. 18—The Trusteeship Council takes no action on the future of the British Cameroon.

Feb. 20—The Republic of Guinea becomes the eighty-second member of the United Nations.

France asks for an end of the U.N. trusteeship over the French Cameroon January 1, 1960.

Feb. 23—Debate on the future of the British and French Cameroons begins in the U.N. General Assembly.

Feb. 27—Five states including the U.S. ask the U.N. to relinquish its trusteeship over the French Cameroon January 1, 1960.

#### AUSTRIA

Feb. 18—The Austrian Cabinet approves an agreement under which Austria would pay \$6 million in compensation and \$600 thousand for administering the funds to persons who lost their property for religious, racial or political reasons during the Nazi regime.

#### ARGENTINA

Feb. 1—President Arturo Frondizi, marking the end of a 12-day visit to the U.S., looks forward to closer Argentine-U.S. ties, and rejects Argentina’s former policies of isolationism and neutralism.

#### BELGIUM

Feb. 16—Belgian coal workers strike in protest against the government’s plan to close under-productive mines.

Feb. 21—The coal strike enters its eighth day with some 100,000 miners unemployed.

Feb. 24—The coal strike is settled in 3 of the 4 coal basins; coal union leaders accept mine owners’ guarantee of a government plan for resettling miners who will be thrown out of work when the mines are shut down.

#### BELGIAN CONGO

Feb. 4—Belgian Minister for the Congo Maurice van Hemelrijck visiting the city of Bukavu is greeted by closed shops and flags at half-staff, interpreted as a warning by European settlers to the Belgian government against cooperating with the nationalist forces working for Congo independence.



Feb. 27—A native advisory council is authorized by Maurice van Hemelrijck to work with the Governor General of the Belgian Congo.

## THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

### Australia

Feb. 15—In a joint communiqué closing the five-day visit of Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio to Australia, he and Australian External Affairs Minister Richard G. Casey reveal that Australia will recognize any agreement reached by Indonesia and the Netherlands on Netherlands New Guinea.

### Canada

Feb. 5—Finance Minister Donald Fleming presents the budget estimates; the total cost of government operations for next year are estimated at a record high of \$6,173,448,000.

Feb. 20—Prime Minister John Diefenbaker reveals that the Government will not proceed with the \$400 million plan for jet interceptor production; nuclear armed missiles will be developed instead.

### Ceylon

Feb. 12—Twelve Trotskyite members of Parliament are carried out of the chamber by armed police after they defy the authority of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Dr. Martin Perera, their leader, is one of those ejected.

Feb. 24—Led by Dr. Perera, the Trotskyite-controlled trade unions plan a one-day token strike, to protest the amending of the Public Security Law.

### Great Britain

Feb. 2—Home Secretary R. A. Butler offers a long-range program for prison reform, in a 32-page White Paper.

Feb. 4—Britain signs an agreement with the six-nation Euratom providing for cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Feb. 5—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan tells Commons he plans to visit Moscow. (For further information see *INTERNATIONAL, Berlin Crisis.*)

Feb. 9—Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd reveals a plan to give the people of

British Somaliland "executive responsibility" in their government by the end of 1960.

Feb. 10—In the Defense White Paper for 1959-1960, the Government reveals plans to expand the regular army and nuclear deterrents.

Feb. 19—Speaker of the House of Commons William S. Morrison reveals plans to retire at the end of the current session.

Feb. 27—Visiting in the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan says international negotiations must be attempted "with a sincere desire to reach fair agreement" on East-West conflicts.

Some 500 West Indians and whites riot in London's Brixton Market district.

Feb. 28—Macmillan warns Soviet leaders that governments must "avoid action that might lead to a dangerous situation."

Signing a formal agreement, Britain and Egypt resolve trade and financial difficulties that grew out of the Suez crisis.

The Ministry of Health reveals that since January 1, 1,903 persons have died of influenza in England and Wales.

### India

Feb. 2—Mrs. Indira Gandhi, daughter of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, is unanimously elected president of the Congress party.

Feb. 15—The Minister of Health, D. P. Kararkar, reveals that the Government will offer sterilization facilities in state-owned hospitals.

Feb. 19—Nehru refuses to consider a suggestion for a coalition "national government," composed of all parties including the opposition.

Feb. 28—Finance Minister Morarji Desai reveals plans for a \$50 million reduction in military spending. A total budgetary deficit of more than \$514 million is anticipated.

### Malaya, Federation of

Feb. 9—The first Prime Minister of the Federation, Tengku (Prince) Abdul Rahman, resigns; he reveals that his Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defense, Dato Abdul Razak bin Hussein, will succeed him.

## Pakistan

Feb. 28—A new decree reinstates military courts and gives them exclusive authority in cases involving martial law.

## Union of South Africa

Feb. 7—Daniel F. Malan, former Prime Minister and supporter of *apartheid*, dies of a stroke at 84.

## BRITISH EMPIRE

## Aden

Feb. 3—The Colonial Office in London announces that 6 western Aden protectorate states have agreed on a proposed Federation and a constitution; the states include: the emirates of Beihan and Dhala, the sultanates of Audhali, Fadhli and Lower Yafa and the Upper Aulaqi sheikdom.

Feb. 11—Arab rulers of the six western Aden protectorate states sign a constitution for the Federation of the Arab Emirates of the South; in a treaty with the new federation, Britain promises future independence.

## Cyprus

Feb. 11—Premier Adnan Menderes of Turkey and Greek Premier Konstantin Karamanlis of Greece end a six-day conference on Cyprus in agreement that Cyprus should become an independent republic outside the Commonwealth after 81 years of British rule. Details are to be drafted in London.

Feb. 17—Turkish Premier Adnan Menderes is injured in an air crash outside London; 15 of his companions are killed in the crash on the eve of the conference on Cyprus.

Feb. 19—British, Greek and Turkish leaders and Turkish and Greek Cypriote leaders agree on an independent republic of Cyprus.

Feb. 22—Greek Cypriotes in detention camps in Cyprus are released.

Feb. 23—Terms of the agreement on Cyprus are published; the British will retain sovereignty over two military enclaves; Cypriote independence is scheduled for a date prior to February 19, 1960; the President of the new Republic

will be an ethnic Greek Cypriote and will be elected by the ethnic Greek Cypriote community, while the Vice President will be an ethnic Turkish Cypriote elected by the ethnic Turkish community; the legislature is to be 70 per cent Greek Cypriote and 30 per cent Turkish Cypriote. "Protecting forces" from Greece, Turkey and Britain will safeguard the island.

Feb. 24—The exile of Archbishop Makarios from Cyprus is officially ended in Nicosia by Governor of the Colony Sir Hugh Foot.

## Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Feb. 24—In the fifth day of African rioting in Nyasaland, troops are called in to quiet disorderly mobs. The African National Congress is campaigning for a break between Nyasaland and Southern and Northern Rhodesia and for an end of "white settler rule."

Feb. 26—Sir Edgar Whitehead, Southern Rhodesia's Prime Minister, declares a state emergency and reveals that between 250 and 500 African leaders have been placed in detention; the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress, the Nyasaland African National Congress, the Zambia National Congress and the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress are declared illegal because of continued rioting, particularly in Nyasaland.

Feb. 28—Tanganyika police help subdue rioting in Nyasaland.

## Malta

Feb. 3—A "day of mourning" is observed by Maltese workers, following a suggestion made by Labor party leader and former Prime Minister Dom Mintoff that such a day be called to protest the revoking of Malta's 1947 constitution by Britain. Malta is now under direct rule of the British Governor.

Feb. 13—Admiral Sir Guy Grantham is named new Governor and Commander in Chief of Malta, succeeding the retiring Major General Sir Robert E. Laycock. The change will take effect in June.

Feb. 16—Voting 273 to 220, Commons approves a bill authorizing the Governor of Malta to govern with an appointed council instead of reinstating the Constitution.

- Feb. 26—A run on the Malta Government savings bank sponsored by Dom Mintoff goes into its fourth day.  
 Feb. 27—As some 6000 British Admiralty dock workers are dismissed, rioting starts in Valetta.

#### BULGARIA

- Feb. 16—It is announced that First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist party Todor Zhivkov has drafted new directives to the Communist party and the National Assembly which schedule a 100 per cent increase in industrial production. The directives provide for decentralization of the administration and the economy with more authority given to local levels.

#### BURMA

- Feb. 13—Burma's Premier General Ne Win resigns. Ne Win declares he will consent to being reappointed premier only if Parliament revises the constitutional law limiting non-members of the Parliament to ministerial terms of six consecutive months only. His 6-month term of office is due to expire in April when elections are scheduled, but the General opposes holding elections then.

#### CAMBODIA

- Feb. 9—Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodian Premier, arrives in Indonesia for a state visit.

#### CHINA (The People's Republic)

- Feb. 1—Chinese Communists resume shelling of the Quemoy Islands (Nationalist Chinese) for the first time in three days.  
 Feb. 7—Premier Chou En-lai and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev sign an agreement in Moscow two days after the close of the Twenty-first Congress of the Soviet Communist party: the Chinese Reds are to receive 5 billion rubles in Soviet economic assistance for the construction of 78 industrial plants.  
 Feb. 23—United States Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson tells the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee that Red China "will not negotiate on the offshore islands" belonging to Nationalist China.

- Feb. 24—Nationalist Chinese Chief of Staff General Wang Shu-ming declares that there has been no reduction of Nationalist forces on the offshore islands since the fighting began last year with Mainland China.

- Feb. 25—Chinese Nationalists report that some 1000 jets have been moved by the Chinese Communists to points about 850 miles from Taiwan (Formosa).

- Feb. 26—Red China and the Soviet Union sign an agreement for increased trade.

#### CUBA

- Feb. 4—The Havana University Students Federation takes control of Havana University and demands the ouster of all pro-Batista faculty.

- Feb. 6—United States citizen Alan Robert Nye, detained by Cuban authorities on the charge that he was hired by former President Batista to assassinate Fidel Castro, denies that he has confessed this.

- Feb. 10—Thirty-two year old Castro is made eligible for the presidency because a new law lowers the age minimum from 35 to 30.

Sugar mill workers go back to their jobs and agree to put off their demands until the crop is harvested.

- Feb. 13—Castro becomes premier following the sudden resignation of Premier Miro Cardona and his Cabinet. The fall of the Cardona government is related to the closing of the casinos.

- Feb. 16—Castro is sworn in as premier. He declares that he does not seek the presidency. He also states that executions of Batista "war criminals" will end this month.

- Feb. 17—Castro's Cabinet authorizes the reopening of the gambling casinos in the tourist hotels.

- Feb. 18—War criminal Major Jesus Sosa Blanco is executed before a firing squad.

- Feb. 28—Castro says general elections will be held in about 2 years.

#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- Feb. 3—It is reported that school children from the ninth grade on will have to work 8 hours per week in a factory or on a farm, in addition to regular school work.

## FRANCE

Feb. 3—The first meeting of the French Overseas Community Executive Council, which includes the premiers of the 12 African states, meets in Paris.

Feb. 4—The Radical Socialist party dismisses ex-Premier Pierre Mendès-France because he joined an organization which worked for the defeat of the Gaullist constitution.

The Cabinet issues decrees regulating municipal elections forthcoming in the next few months. Such regulations are aimed at eliminating Communists from municipal offices.

Feb. 12—Former President Vincent Auriol resigns from the Socialist party in criticism of party leader Guy Mollet.

Feb. 13—The newly-formed extreme Rightist Nationalist party is abolished by the government. The government also prohibits a Leftist political meeting scheduled today.

Feb. 20—The nine appointed members of the Fifth Republic's Constitutional Council are named.

## FRENCH OVERSEAS COMMUNITY, THE

## Algeria

Feb. 8—Premier Michel Debré, in a speech on his arrival in Algiers, declares that "... the Government . . . shall forthwith bring a new determination to bear for the French sovereignty which covers this side of the Mediterranean as it does the other." His statement is happily received by conservative Algerian Europeans who desire integration of Algeria with France.

Feb. 9—Debré says that the French government will not negotiate abroad with leaders of the Algerian Provisional Government.

Feb. 10—The first meeting of the 46-man commission for the economic development of Algeria calls for investments by French and foreign interests.

Feb. 12—Premier Charles de Gaulle tells his ministers to visit Algeria often to make sure that government policy towards that area is carried out.

Feb. 16—It is reported that 47 Algerian nationalists have been killed by French troops in three clashes.

Feb. 26—French Delegate General Paul Delouvrier outlines regulations for elections to municipal councils on which Muslims are virtually assured of gaining control in towns where Europeans are a minority (nearly everywhere). The elections are scheduled for April.

## Chad

Feb. 10—The government headed by Gabriel Lisette falls on a vote, 30-17, in the Legislative Assembly.

## Dahomey

Feb. 14—Dahomey unanimously adopts its constitution; elections will be held April 2.

## Sudan

Feb. 8—The Segou Democratic party is outlawed and its president is arrested.

GERMANY, EAST (See also *International; Berlin Crisis.*)

Feb. 28—It is revealed in Leipzig that Premier Otto Grotewohl is on leave because of ill health.

GERMANY, WEST (See also *International; Berlin Crisis.*)

Feb. 2—The Western Allies tell West Germany they will set up a special committee to consider Alfred Krupp's petition to have another year to dispose of his industrial holdings.

Feb. 6—The Bundesrat, the upper house of Parliament which has no voice in the matter, registers its dislike of the coal tariff recently imposed by the Bonn government. The government declares that it has informed the U.S. that the tariff was an emergency step that would lapse by the year's end.

Feb. 10—It is reported that the West German Army has been ordered to increase its military preparedness.

Feb. 12—It is announced that a Federal Assembly will meet July 1 to elect a new West German president.

The Social Democrats nominate their deputy premier, Dr. Carlo Schmid, as presidential candidate.

Feb. 24—Dr. Ludwig Erhard, Minister of the Economy, is the Christian Democratic choice for the presidency.



Feb. 26—Christian Democrats in the Bundestag (lower house) at a meeting oppose the nomination of Erhard for the presidency.

Feb. 28—Dr. Ludwig Erhard withdraws his opposition to a West German military aviation industry.

## GUATEMALA

Feb. 19—The dispute between the U.S.-owned International Railways of Central America and its 5,000 workers over a wage increase is settled.

## HAITI

Feb. 9—President Francois Duvalier says that his country needs U.S. aid.

Feb. 27—It is reported that the U.S. yesterday gave the Haitian government \$6 million in aid.

## HONDURAS

Feb. 9—Government troops quell a rebel uprising in northwest Honduras. The army retakes the captured city of Santa Barbara.

Feb. 10—President Ramon Villeda Morales announces that the last vestiges of resistance will shortly be terminated by army forces.

Feb. 26—Honduras and Nicaragua sign an agreement against permitting their territories to be used by rebels against their regimes.

## HUNGARY

Feb. 20—Bela Kovacs, who served in Imre Nagy's Cabinet during the short-lived Hungarian revolt in the fall of 1956, praises the Communist regime after two years of silence.

## ICELAND

Feb. 5—The British trawler *Valafell* is arrested and escorted into an Icelandic port for fishing within 4 miles of Iceland's port.

Feb. 7—The British trawler *Valafell* is fined 74,000 kroner (about \$4,500) for fishing inside the 12-mile limit.

## INDONESIA

Feb. 2—It is revealed that Indonesia has asked the U.S. to sell it \$10 million in small arms and other equipment.

Feb. 8—It is reported that President Eisen-

hower has approved the sale of light military equipment to the Indonesian Army.

Feb. 16—It is reported that Indonesian Premier Djuanda has informed Britain that a "satisfactory solution" will be found to the government's seizure of 2 British-owned rubber plantations in Sumatra early in the month.

Feb. 17—Indonesia declares that compensation for Dutch holdings now nationalized will be forthcoming only when Indonesia and the Netherlands have settled their differences, including that over New Guinea.

Feb. 20—President Sukarno in a speech to the nation urges the re-establishment of the 1945 Constitution to enable him to carry through his program of "guided democracy." The 1945 Constitution contained strong executive powers.

## IRAN

Feb. 3—A Teheran source says that Iran and the U.S.S.R. are negotiating a new treaty of friendship under which Moscow may give up its right, under a 1921 treaty, to send troops into Iran if their border is endangered.

Feb. 5—It is reported that Iran has refused to agree to a Soviet proposal that it refuse to sign a bilateral defense treaty with the U.S.

Feb. 11—President Eisenhower of the U.S., British Prime Minister Macmillan, Turkish President Celal Bayar and Pakistani President Mohammed Ayub Khan, it is announced, have sent notes urging Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi to maintain firm ties with the Western alliance. The Western leaders ask him to forsake Soviet offers of a non-aggression pact and economic assistance, and to sign a new economic and defense agreement with the U.S., which had earlier refused an Iranian request for an explicit defense arrangement.

Feb. 12—Talks with the Soviet Union on an economic and defense treaty are broken off.

Feb. 15—Foreign Minister Ali Asghar Hekmat declares that Iran will stay within the Western alliance.

Feb. 21—The Shah declares that his country and the U.S. will sign a mutual defense treaty.

Feb. 28—Following the resignation of Plan Director Abol Hassan Ebtehaj, Premier Eghbal takes personal charge of the Plan Organization for economic development.

## IRAQ

Feb. 4—Three of assassinated Prince Faisal's high government officials are sentenced to death by the new regime of Premier Abdul Karim Kassim.

Feb. 7—Premier Kassim accepts the resignation of 6 Cabinet ministers and names 8 new ones.

Feb. 10—It is believed that Soviet arms shipments to Iraq have doubled its military strength. Some 15 to 20 thousand tons of matériel, it is estimated, have been sent since last November.

Feb. 25—Sources disclose that U.A.R. President Nasser has offered to meet with Kassim to improve understanding between them.

## ISRAEL

Feb. 4—The United Nations Emergency Force stationed along the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Desert accuses 4 Israelis of an attack on a Bedouin camp on the U.A.R. side of the border last night in which 2 Arabs were killed.

Feb. 7—The Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Committee holds Israel at fault in attacking the Bedouin camp.

Feb. 17—U.A.R. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi declares that the U.A.R. will oppose mass migration of East European Jews to Israel. It is estimated that some 10,000 Jews are emigrating monthly from East Europe, particularly Rumania.

Feb. 20—Israeli Premier David Ben-Gurion says that Israel can absorb a great many more refugees.

Feb. 24—Treasury sources announce that a 10 to 15 per cent increase in purchase taxes and customs duties on certain goods has been set to help finance a flux of immigration from East Europe.

## ITALY

Feb. 2—The crisis created by Amintore Fanfani's resignation as premier continues. A quadrumvirate is appointed to replace Fanfani as party secretary for the Christian Democrats.

Feb. 6—Antonio Segni is asked to form a new government.

Feb. 7—A split develops within the Democratic Socialist party. A Left-wing group, consisting of about one-fourth of the party's membership, declares autonomy; Left-wingers want the Democratic Socialists to unite with the Left-wing Socialists led by Pietro Nenni.

Feb. 15—Segni names his Christian Democratic minority Cabinet, which has the support of Monarchists and Liberals to give it the necessary majority in the Chamber of Deputies.

Feb. 16—President Giovanni Gronchi swears the new government into office.

Feb. 27—Voting 333 to 248 with one abstention, the Chamber of Deputies gives Segni a vote of confidence. This is the largest confidence vote given to any Premier since the founding of the republic in 1948.

## JAPAN

Feb. 25—Marching and other protests are made in Japan because of Japan's decision to allow the International Red Cross to repatriate 600,000 Korean refugees said to want to return to Communist North Korea.

South Korea offers to confer with Japan on settling fishing rights and other difficulties if Japan will reverse the repatriation decision.

Feb. 28—The Foreign Ministry announces the signing of a treaty of commerce and navigation with Yugoslavia.

## KUWAIT

Feb. 10—It is reported that Sheik Abdullah Salem Sabbah, ruler of this sheikdom, has restored order following pro-Nasser rioting.

## LAOS

Feb. 11—Premier Phoui Sananikone announces a government decision renouncing the Geneva agreement of 1954 terminating the Indochina war. Sananikone declares that Laos will rely on the U.N. to arbitrate conflicts. The government's action is directed at North Vietnam whose soldiers last month occupied a strip of Laotian territory along the frontier.

**LIBYA**

Feb. 18—Libya requests 'further U.S. assistance. The U.S. already gives Libya extensive financial and development assistance in return for the Wheelus air base at Tripoli.

**LUXEMBOURG**

Feb. 1—In parliamentary elections the Christian Socialists (Roman Catholic) lose 6 seats to the Liberals who now hold 12 of the 52 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

Feb. 25—A new government of Christian Socialists and Liberals is announced.

**NEPAL**

Feb. 18—Elections begin to the House of Representatives, as provided in the new Constitution presented last week by King Mahendra, as Nepal makes its first attempt at parliamentary democracy. The voting will be staggered through April 3.

**PANAMA**

Feb. 20—President Ernestode la Guardia asks for the resignation of the City Council as a general strike against corruption in the Council brings the city to a virtual standstill.

A Citizens' Emergency Committee swears in a new City Council.

Feb. 21—The National Guard is called out to avoid any possibility of rioting near the city hall in Panama city. A third City Council is sworn in by Provincial Governor José Cajar Escala.

**PHILIPPINES**

Feb. 15—Eight towns in the Pangasinan Province in Luzon are put on an emergency basis as the Government fights guerrilla activities there.

Feb. 20—U.S. Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen leaves Washington to return to his Manila post. It is reported that he will act for the U.S. in acceding to Philippine demands for compensation for war-time losses and will try to persuade Filipinos to abandon plans for a tax on foreign exchange.

Feb. 28—Philippine Navy men board and search 5 Russian trawlers in Philippine waters.

**RUMANIA**

Feb. 25—An official Rumanian statement charges that Israel has used the migration of Jewish Rumanian emigrants to Israel to foster ill feeling between Communist East Europe and the U.A.R.

**SPAIN**

Feb. 1—Both liberal and Rightist foes of the Franco regime organize the Spanish Union. This is illegal because Franco has barred all political parties but the Falange.

**SWITZERLAND**

Feb. 1—Male voters defeat a constitutional amendment to allow women to vote in national elections and to run for national offices.

**THAILAND**

Feb. 6—A joint communiqué issued by Thailand and Cambodia announces resumption of diplomatic relations and the reopening of the common frontier shortly.

Feb. 10—Premier Sarit Thanarat's 14-man Cabinet is approved by King Phumiphol Aduldet.

**TUNISIA**

Feb. 14—Tunisia charges that three French planes have attacked a group of Tunisians within their border. Two have been killed and 8 wounded.

Feb. 17—Bourguiba tells France that unless it recognizes Algerian "nationalist aspirations," the French may lose their naval base at Bizerte.

**U.S.S.R., THE**

Feb. 1—A U.S. Roman Catholic priest holds the first mass "on a regular basis" since 1955.

Feb. 5—At the closing session of the party congress Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev condemns Western policy, and at the same time invites U.S. President Eisenhower to Moscow.

Feb. 14—West Germany agrees to allow the importation of about 1000 Russian automobiles.

Soviet and Chinese leaders in Moscow affirm their unity. They declare that U.S. reports of unfavorable Soviet criticism of China's communes are aimed at impairing Chinese-Soviet ties.

Feb. 15—Boris Pasternak, author of *Dr. Zhivago*, discloses that he will seek readmission to the Soviet Writers' Union.

Feb. 16—The Soviet Union reiterates that it knows nothing of the 11 missing American airmen.

Feb. 18—The Soviet Union says it has evidence, i.e. "remnants of special technical apparatus," which proves that the missing plane of last September "could not lose its course."

Feb. 20—Reports from Communist sources in East Europe reveal that despite his retention of high posts, Chairman of the Presidium of the Soviet Union Marshal Kliment Y. Voroshilov was part of the June, 1957, "anti-party" movement defeated by Khrushchev.

Feb. 21—Soviet newspaper statements declare that the U.S.S.R. will not risk Arab hostility by permitting Jewish emigration to Israel.

Feb. 25—Swedish, Danish and Norwegian Ambassadors to Moscow invite Khrushchev to visit their countries.

#### UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Feb. 20—Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia is greeted by U.A.R. President Abdel Gamal Nasser as he begins a 10-day visit.

#### UNITED STATES

##### Agriculture

Feb. 10—Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson reveals that the President has chosen him to direct the Food for Peace program.

##### The Arts

Feb. 28—Playwright Maxwell Anderson dies at 70.

##### Civil Rights

Feb. 5—President Eisenhower sends Congress a comprehensive civil rights program, including measures to encourage and support localities working toward school integration.

Feb. 8—Democratic Senate Leader Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas says that his civil rights bill introduced January 20 provides a better way to avoid future conflicts over school integration.

Feb. 13—The Justice Department requests

a court order preventing destruction of voter registration records in Macon County, Georgia; county registration authorities are charged by the federal government with systematic denial of voting rights to Negroes.

Feb. 18—The Alabama legislature authorizes registration officials to destroy voting records after 30 days.

##### The Economy

Feb. 7—A Federal Reserve staff study reports that re-employment is slower after this recession than it was after two earlier post-war declines.

Feb. 10—The Departments of Commerce and Labor report that the total unemployed in January, 1959, was the highest January total in 18 years—4,724,000.

Feb. 18—President Eisenhower opposes a continuing program of emergency federal aid for the unemployed; he believes "we are on a curve of rising prosperity."

##### Foreign Policy

Feb. 1—Argentine President Arturo Frondizi ends a 12-day visit to the U.S.

Feb. 5—A tape recording is made public by the State Department; the tape carries voices alleged to be Russian fighter pilots as they deliberately shot down an unarmed American Air Force transport plane September 2, 1958. The Soviet Union has denied the validity of the tape recording.

Feb. 6—President Eisenhower's press secretary, James C. Hagerty, says that the President would not visit the Soviet Union in response to "an offhand invitation extended in a political speech."

Feb. 10—Speaking at a press conference, the President notes that it is possible that false radio signals from the U.S.S.R. may lead U.S. pilots off course into Soviet territory.

Feb. 12—In a special message, Eisenhower asks Congress to increase the U.S. contribution to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund.

Feb. 13—A spokesman for the State Department reveals that Ambassador Walter C. Dowling has been ordered back to Korea because of tensions between Japan and Korea.



Feb. 20—A joint statement from Acapulco, Mexico, reveals that President Eisenhower and Mexican President Adolfo Lopez Mateos agree that work on the projected Diablo dam on the Rio Grande should proceed. The statement is issued at the close of Eisenhower's 2-day visit to Mexico.

Feb. 26—The Navy's radar picket escort ship *Roy O. Hale* sends a searching party aboard the Russian fishing trawler *Novorossisk* off Newfoundland in the course of an investigation of damage to five transoceanic cables. "No indications of intentions other than fishing" are reported. The U.S. cites a convention of 1885 concerning submarine cables as justification for the action.

Feb. 27—The U.S. reports to the U.S.S.R. on the searching of a Soviet fishing boat off Newfoundland; *Tass* calls the action "unlawful."

#### Government

Feb. 2—The Federal Power Commission says that the state of New York cannot force the Tuscarora Indians to surrender part of their reservation for the Niagara Power project.

Feb. 4—President Eisenhower names Philip K. Crowe as Ambassador to the Union of South Africa, succeeding Henry A. Byroade, now Ambassador to Afghanistan.

Both houses of Congress vote for budget increases in housing in opposition to the President.

Feb. 6—The Treasury reveals that holders of more than \$2 billion in maturing Government securities have refused to exchange them for new government securities; an emergency borrowing operation will be scheduled.

Feb. 7—White House press secretary James C. Hagerty says he did not try to influence the Federal Communications Commission on behalf of an Albany television channel; the accusation against Hagerty was made by former counsel for a House subcommittee Bernard Schwartz in his forthcoming book, *The Professor and the Commissions*.

Feb. 8—Bernard Schwartz says that Congress should investigate relations between James Hagerty and the F.C.C.

Feb. 9—At the annual meeting of the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, the head of the Rural Electrification Administration advises rural electric cooperatives to look for private financing.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles takes an indefinite leave of absence to go into the hospital for surgery; in a letter to the President, he asks permission to turn over State Department management to Under Secretary Christian Herter and, subordinately, C. Douglas Dillon.

Feb. 10—President Eisenhower says that interest rates on loans to rural electric cooperatives should be raised to a level "that will recover the cost of money" the Government lends them.

Feb. 12—Poet Carl Sandburg addresses a joint session of Congress, speaking of Abraham Lincoln.

Feb. 14—Doctors report that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles is suffering a recurrence of cancer.

Feb. 23—A recount of ballots for the governorship begins in Nebraska; Republicans have challenged the election of Democrat Ralph G. Brooks.

Feb. 25—The President says that Dulles' fitness to continue in office cannot be determined until the end of his radiation therapy.

Feb. 26—President Eisenhower names Clare Boothe Luce Ambassador to Brazil, succeeding Ellis O. Briggs.

#### Labor

Feb. 6—The A.F.L.-C.I.O. criticizes the Administration's labor reform bill as anti-labor.

Feb. 7—Secretary of Labor Mitchell says he is not opposed to passage of more than one labor reform bill.

Striking members of the National Maritime Union return to work in New York harbor after a 6 and a half day strike.

Feb. 13—The Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field hears that the New York juke box industry is continually threatened by hoodlums using union fronts.

Feb. 18—The A.F.L.-C.I.O. asks for a shorter working week and higher wages.

Feb. 19—The A.F.L.-C.I.O. meeting in Puerto Rico plans to push for a federal minimum wage guarantee of \$1.25.

- Feb. 23—The Executive Council of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. decides to try to organize Puerto Rico's truck drivers and other workers in a catch-all local, in a move to counter Teamster president James Hoffa's efforts to organize Puerto Rican workers in the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, now outside the A.F.L.-C.I.O.
- Feb. 24—The A.F.L.-C.I.O. demands direct union representation on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board and its 12 regional banks.

The A.F.L.-C.I.O. decides to call a "mass conference" on unemployment in Washington, instead of a "mass march" or a legislative conference.

- Feb. 26—Pan American World Airways stock clerks at Cape Canaveral vote to join the Teamsters union.
- Feb. 27—Dave Beck is fined \$60,000 and jailed for five years for income tax evasion.

#### Military Policy

- Feb. 3—William B. Franke will succeed Thomas S. Gates, Jr. as Secretary of the Navy, according to a White House announcement. The change will be effective in June.
- Feb. 5—President Eisenhower's vacation headquarters reveal the appointment of Vice Admiral Robert L. Dennison as Commander-in-Chief of U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean and eastern Atlantic.
- Feb. 6—A successful firing of a Titan intercontinental ballistic missile is announced.
- Feb. 10—The Defense Department asks Congress for a new construction program costing \$1,356,290,000.
- Feb. 17—The Navy's Project Vanguard fires a meteorological satellite into orbit.

#### Politics

- Feb. 16—Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy writes an article for *Look* magazine supporting the separation of church and state and opposing the use of federal funds for aiding private or parochial schools.
- Feb. 22—Senator John F. Kennedy declares that 1960 would be an "appropriate time" for him to reveal plans about the Democratic presidential nomination.
- Feb. 27—Los Angeles is chosen for the

- Democratic National Convention of 1960.
- Feb. 28—In California, the Air Force attempts to launch a Discoverer I satellite into orbit over the North and South Poles.

#### School Segregation

- Feb. 2—Public schools open on a racially integrated basis in Norfolk and in Arlington, Virginia.
- Feb. 3—Federal District Judge John E. Miller of Fort Smith, Arkansas, says the court cannot allow the Little Rock School Board to reopen high schools on a segregated basis temporarily.
- Feb. 13—Federal District Court Judge Emmett C. Choate says that Florida's pupil placement law is like Alabama's and cites a Supreme Court decision that the Alabama law is constitutional "on its face." Protests against pupil placement must be made first through administrative channels.
- Feb. 18—The Dade County (Florida) School Board decides that 4 Negroes will be admitted to a "white" public school in September, 1959.
- Feb. 19—As a high school in Front Royal, Virginia, reopens on an integrated basis, 22 Negroes attend but all white students boycott the thousand-pupil school.

#### Supreme Court

- Feb. 20—The American Bar Association's Board of Governors accepts the resignation of Chief Justice Earl Warren.

#### VENEZUELA

- Feb. 13—President-Elect Romulo Betancourt is inaugurated. He announces his coalition cabinet.

#### VIETNAM, NORTH

- Feb. 18—Red China gives North Vietnam \$168,775,000 or its equivalent in aid. The money will be used to construct 49 industrial and communications projects.

#### YUGOSLAVIA

- Feb. 2—The Development Loan Fund is authorized by the U.S. State Department to give Yugoslavia a \$5 million loan for the improvement of government-owned railways.

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